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ABSTRACT
Unexpected events, particularly those creating surprise, interrupt ongoing mental and
behavioral processes, creating an increased potential for unwanted outcomes to the situation.
Human reactions to unexpected events vary. One can hypothesize a number of reasons for this
variation, including level of domain expertise, previous experience with similar events,
emotional connotation, and the contextual surround of the event. Whereas interrupting ongoing
activities and focusing attention temporarily on a surprising event may be a useful evolutionary
response to a threatening situation, the same process may be maladaptive in today’s highly
dynamic world.
The purpose of this study was to investigate how different aspects of expertise affected
one’s ability to detect and react to an unexpected event. It was hypothesized that there were two
general types of expertise, domain expertise and judgment (Hammond, 2000), which influenced
one’s performance on dealing with an unexpected event. The goal of the research was to parse
out the relative contribution of domain expertise, so the role of judgment could be revealed.
The research questions for this study were: (a) Can we identify specific knowledges and
skills which enhance one’s ability to deal with unexpected events? (b)

Are these skills

“automatically” included in domain expertise? (c) How does domain expertise improve or deter
one’s reaction and response to unexpected events? (d) What role does judgment play in
responding to surprise? The general hypothesis was that good judgment would influence the
process of surprise at different stages and in different ways than would domain expertise.
The conclusions from this research indicated that good judgment had a significant positive
effect in helping pilots deal with unexpected events. This was most pronounced when domain
expertise was low.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Studies and discussions about the causes, responses, and outcomes of unexpected events
span a wide array of domains and contexts. These range from the unexpected presence of a
compound in the body impinging upon a cellular structure (Whitfield, Morley, & Willick, 1998)
to the surprise at finding a new galaxy in space (Lyne, et al., 2004). Surprise and unexpectedness
have been studied in medical applications, such as reactions to drug dosages, and events
occurring during surgery or amongst operating team members (Woods & Patterson, 2001). For
example, scientists were overwhelmingly surprised when they identified an unexpected
mechanism that triggers increased blood flow to brain cells actively engaged in work, which may
indeed open new doors to understanding many disease processes (Mintun, Vlassenko, Rundle, &
Raichle, 2003).
Dealing with unexpected life events is a common thread in scientific, clinical, and popular
psychology publications (e.g., Hammond, Keeney, & Raiffa, 1999; Watkins, & Bazerman,
2003). In the business arena, unexpected events occupy a strong presence in management
training and corporate culture literature (Kylen, 1985; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). There is now a
focus on unexpected events in national security and international relations as a result of the
surprises of September 11, 2001, and countermeasures have begun to take shape. The American
National Red Cross now teaches, through a brochure, that “there are things you can do to prepare
for the unexpected and reduce the stress that you may feel now and later should another
emergency arise. Taking preparatory action can reassure you and your children that you can
exert a measure of control even in the face of such events” (American Red Cross, 2001, p.1).
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Reactions to the unexpected have also been widely studied from an evolutionary
perspective where the nature of the response was shown to be adaptive for animals and humans
(Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Inglis, 2000). For example, animal studies by Spinka, Newberry,
and Bekoff (2001) demonstrated that animals’ use of play enhances their ability to respond to
unexpected events. Similarly, researchers (Bell & Wolfe, 2004; Hammond, 2000) investigated
developmental changes in the emotion of surprise in infants and children exposed to unexpected
events. The vast interest in unexpected events throughout the universe may indeed be generated
by a desire for constancy (Hammond, 2000; Matsumoto & Tanaka, 2004); where any disruption
to expectations results in a state of dissonance. Depending on the valance and degree of this
dissonance, unexpected events have the potential to elicit joy or displeasure (Damasio, 1999;
LeDoux, 2002) and produce associated cognitive and behavioral consequences (Meyer et. al.,
1997) which may be categorized as manifestations of the emotion of surprise.
In aviation, unexpectedness and the associated pilots’ reactions to it are major contributors
to loss-of-control in flight, the largest category of fatal commercial air carrier accidents between
1994 and 2003 (Boeing Commercial Airplanes Group, 2004). Loss-of-control accidents were
also the leading cause of general aviation accidents in the United States in 2003 (AOPA Air
Safety Foundation, 2004), and these accidents have been on the constant increase for all
categories of flight, including corporate aviation, for the past 25 years. Each year, millions of
dollars are spent trying to train pilots to prepare for these “unexpected” events hoping to improve
pilot performance in the event that they might occur. Thus, gaining insight into how one can best
deal with the unexpected has important implications across a wide field of application areas.
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Problem Statement
As the above examples illustrate, events perceived to be unexpected are those which “come
without warning” or are “unforeseen” (American Heritage Dictionary, 1992, p. 1950).
Unexpected events have the potential to induce varied reactions, ranging from surprise to
behavioral “freezing.”

In fact, unexpected events can trigger alterations in neurological,

physiological, psychological, behavioral, and social processes.1 Most importantly though,
reactions to unexpected events involve processes whose associated cognitive and behavioral
influences have wide spread implications to human performance in a wide variety of domains. I
therefore believe that the study of pilots’ reactions to unexpected events is a topic which merits
further investigation.
A good place to begin exploring this problem area is in how unexpected events have been
dealt with in training protocols, specifically in aviation. Teaching people to deal with unexpected
events has traditionally involved superficial exposure to all varieties and combinations of
possible situations complete with examples of appropriate responses. In highly dynamic and/or
ill-structured domains, where the unexpected is plentiful, however, trainers will find it
impractical, if not impossible, to provide exposure to all possible surprising events. Most events
in aviation are ill-structured (Orasanu & Connolly, 1993), such that one situation may resemble
another, but it is unlikely to be identical. To train all possible events is an attempt to teach one to
anticipate the unexpected and make it the “expected.” While this approach is believed to be
beneficial, “unexpected” situations will remain, requiring pilots to respond in novel and creative
ways.

1

Surprise is at once a verb; “to encounter suddenly or unexpectedly; take or catch unawares; to cause to feel
wonder, astonishment or amazement, as at something unanticipated or out of the ordinary” and a noun; “the
condition of being surprised” (American Heritage Dictionary, 1992, p. 1808)
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Training for specific unexpected events as a reactive measure, however, likely will not
inoculate pilots against the next new unexpected situation. An important aspect of training for
unexpected events is its applicability beyond the specific event trained. Ultimately, the goal
would be to marry cognitive skill (judgment) training with the requisite “stick and rudder”
(domain) skills necessary to successfully perceive, process, and respond to any unexpected
situation. In sum, aviation has attempted to address loss-of-control and other situations arising
from unexpected events by targeting specific events with domain skill training. Unfortunately,
aviation accident and incident statistics suggest this approach has not been completely successful
(Boeing Commercial Airplanes Group, 2004; Federal Aviation Administration, 2001).
The purpose of this study was to identify the specific cognitive components active in
reactions to unexpected events. Specifically, I investigated the influence of (a) domain expertise,
(b) judgment2, and (c) the interaction of the two, at various stages in a process model of the
cognitive reactions to unexpected events The ultimate goal was to determine what specific
knowledges, skills, and/or abilities are required to best respond to unexpected events, thus
making it possible to provide specific training for the acquisition of these skill sets. Training in
the target areas could be instrumental in contributing to the appropriate responses which result in
successful outcomes, even in instances where there was no previous specific exposure or training
to that particular unexpected event.

2

The use of the term “judgment” implies the same meaning as “cognitive judgment” rather than “perceptual
judgment” as distinguished by Jensen (1995).
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CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL BASIS AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
To facilitate understanding and minimize ambiguity of the theoretical and practical aspects
of this study, brief definitions of the constructs of interest are included in each section. In cases
where terms may have multiple meanings, the choice of definition selected for this study does
not imply correctness. It is merely an attempt to clarify what is sought to be construed in this
context.
Description of Responses to the Unexpected: Types and Manifestations
One of the first steps in this study was to determine what pilots find unexpected. The
nature of surprise can be categorized in various ways. Two characterizations of the varieties and
forms of unexpected events are offered as examples from the business world and aviation. It is
interesting that the same themes were found in these two, rather diverse applications, as
summarized in Table 1. As shown in the table, Kylen (1985) suggested the unexpected in
business can come in five forms.
The first type is called “a bolt from the blue,” when something happens with no
expectation, hint, or prior model of the event even being plausible. For example, someone is
diagnosed with a disease for which there were no risk factors or predisposing conditions. The
second type is when the event is known, but the direction of one’s expectation is incorrect. Here,
one may expect to have very high cholesterol levels, based on diet and lifestyle, however, the
level is unexpectedly low. The third form is when something is expected at a certain time and
place, and it occurs at some other time and/or place. Another type of unexpected event is when
something is expected to take a certain amount of time and unexpectedly takes longer or happens
faster. “Duration events” are found often in the stock market or other investment entities where
one expects the market to “turn around” and it does so, but very slowly. It is interesting to note,
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that the expectations of the investors are seldom modified to be in line with the fluctuations of
the markets. The last type of unexpectedness, according to Kylen, is when a problem is expected,
but its severity is not. In other words, one is aware of the problem, but the projected impact of
the event is underestimated. This may have even been the case with the loss of space shuttle
Columbia (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2003).
Table 1
Comparison of the Categorization of Unexpected Events in Two Domains

Domain
Business (Kylen, 1985)

Aviation (Kochan, et. al., 2004)

(1) Event occurs with no prior expectation
or cues (“bolt from the blue”)

(1) Insidious events occur where the
unexpected event unfolds over time

(2) Event is known, but expectation is in the
wrong direction

(2) Subliminal appearance, where the
event cues were neither overt nor
blatant

(3) Event is expected, but occurs at some
other time or place

(3) Events perceived as unexpected and
causing surprise are not often rare or
novel, rather, they are usual and
routine

(4) Temporal expectation is wrong (event
unfolds too fast or too slow)

(4) Events perceived as unexpected most
often have cues available which, if
used, would make the event less
surprising

(5) Event is known, however the severity of
the event is surprising

In another study, Kochan, Breiter, and Jentsch (2004) showed that the nature of the
reactions to the unexpected is governed by four principles, also displayed in Table 1. The
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unexpected can be insidious, subliminal, usual, or routine, and more often than not, there were
cues available to suggest that the unexpected should have been expected.
The final interesting point from the review of actual accidents and incidents was the
behavioral responses which arose from the unexpected events (Kochan et al., 2004). On a broad
scale, regardless of the nature of the event or outcome severity, pilots either, (a) focused on the
unexpected situation, addressed the condition, and returned to pre-event duties or; (b) focused on
the unexpected situation and fixated on an aspect, without returning to the ongoing activities in a
timely manner. The risk in this fixation would be particularly detrimental when piloting an
aircraft where the ongoing task of flying must be attended to continuously. The investigation into
aviation related accidents and incidents revealed that antecedents to unexpected events are often
sublime, and do not typically emanate from highly unusual situations. More often than not,
unwanted outcomes may have been preventable if information that was readily available had
been noticed and considered. Given this, one can begin to look at the cognitive underpinnings
that may help to explain the cognitive and behavioral effects of unexpected events and their
associated consequences.
Description and Definition of Domain Expertise and Judgment
Are Domain Expertise and Judgment Separate Constructs?
The following brief discussion of expertise research and the concept of separate constructs
of domain expertise and judgment abilities will be integral to the identification of the specific
underlying skills necessary for responding to unexpected events. It is the tight integration of
type, amount, frequency, and diversity of training, and experience, intertwined with other
cognitive skills and abilities that I seek to separate in this study. In this case, I intend to parse out
the relative contribution of domain expertise to one’s performance on the task of dealing with an
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unexpected event in order to identify the role of judgment. Conversely, other research has
attempted to separate the judgment skills away from the domain expertise by minimizing the
necessity of using judgment in the completion of tasks. Studies conducted in assessment centers
(Kleinmann, 1993; Smith-Jentsch, 1996) indicated that revealing the nature of the domain task
(making the dimensions of the task transparent to the applicant) improved the construct validity
of the task.
My premise was that specific domain knowledge and expertise play one role in successful
responses to surprise. However, ample evidence was presented to suggest other, more global and
trainable judgment skills had at least some influence over many aspects and, in at least one part
of the process, were key to a successful outcome in the process of surprise. In other words, I did
not (and do not) believe that merely increasing one’s level of domain expertise or domain
knowledge is the most effective way to improve responses to unexpected events. Indeed, there
was evidence for separate constructs of domain and judgment. There was also a significant
interaction effect at certain times during the reaction to the event. The next section presents the
details of the two separate constructs of expertise considered in this study.
Domain Expertise
In a review of the literature, there did not appear to be a universally accepted definition of
what constitutes domain expertise. The prerequisite of possessing innate abilities in order to
exhibit expertise in a particular domain, or in everyday living, has been successfully challenged
by Ericsson and Charness (1994). Their research, and review of the literature, indicated the most
salient features in becoming a domain expert, were extensive and sustained deliberate practice
(about four hours per day) over an extended period of time (approximately 10 years or more) on
a specific task or skill set from a chosen domain. The evidence showed a general predisposition
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to engage in deliberate practice appeared to be the most distinguishing individual difference,
rather than an innate, domain specific or domain congruent ability as put forth by Gardner
(1983). Therefore, it was argued that by means of practice over time, one was able to acquire and
implement different forms of knowledge which constitute domain expertise. Consequently, the
construct of domain expertise in this study was indicated by one’s declarative, procedural, and
structural knowledge as depicted in Figure 1. These domain factors are defined next in order to
understand the role they play in domain expertise and to facilitate their manipulation in this
study.

Expertise
Factors

Structural
Knowledge
Procedural
Knowledge

Declarative
Knowledge

Domain
Expertise

Figure 1. Domain specific factors involved in domain expertise.
Declarative Knowledge
Declarative knowledge (as used here) was simply the number and availability of facts to
which one may have access.
Procedural Knowledge
Procedural knowledge (as used here) was the number and availability of procedures
which may be used in domain specific tasks.
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Structural Knowledge
In addition to exceptional knowledge of facts (declarative knowledge) and knowledge
about how to accomplish a task (procedural knowledge), research suggested that people who had
developed expertise in an area show differences from novices in how their knowledge is stored,
structured, and retrieved (Chi, Glaser, & Farr, 1988). These differences were, in part, due to the
depth, breadth, and number of schemata and action scripts available and used by an individual.
Two main sub-components of structural knowledge were addressed in this study; schemata and
action scripts.
Schemata
As part of structural knowledge, schemata are developed based on our past experiences
with objects, scenes, and events, to create expectations as to what these objects, scenes, and
events should resemble in the future (Hammond, 2000; Jones & Endsley, 2000; Meyer et al.,
1997). Schemata guide our (a) comprehension of the current information, and (b) prediction of
future events (Schützwohl, 1998). Schemata can be described in terms of three components:
number, breadth, and depth. Schema number is the number of schemata activated for a given
event. The number of schema activated depends on what information is perceived from the
environment. If a given event is fairly simple, it may only require that one schema be activated to
correctly understand the event. However, a more complex event may require several schemata to
be activated in order to have a complete understanding. Schema breadth, on the other hand, can
be defined as the “expanse of knowledge across system components” (Burke, 1999, p. 16). The
greater the breadth, the more an individual is able to integrate the multiple constructs involved to
better understand a complex or novel event.
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Each schema also contains a number of interconnected variables. These interconnections
combined with the number, breadth, and depths of variables determine the strength of a
particular schema (Schützwohl, 1998). It is important to point out that schemata are initially
formed through experience and training; therefore, they may or may not be accurate (Moray,
1996). Once formed, they are constantly monitored for evidence of contradictory incoming
information. It is this monitoring and subsequent revision of schemata by way of incorporating
new variables and/or modifying interconnections that improves the accuracy and therefore their
usefulness for predicting future events. The predictive value of schema varies with the accuracy
of its representation of true reality.
Generally, those with more expertise in a domain will have more, deeper, richer, and more
accurate schemata relevant to their field than those with less expertise. As domain expertise
increases, so does the breadth of one’s schemata. The depth of the activated schemata, or its
complexity and insightfulness, also depends on the individual’s expertise and past experiences
with similar events (Ceci & Liker, 1987). When people gain expertise and experience in a given
situation, their schemata are redefined to incorporate relevant information that might have
previously been seen as unimportant and irrelevant. This suggests the correct identification of
discrepant events increases as domain expertise increases.
Action Scripts
Action scripts (Gioia & Manz, 1985; Klein, 2003) are also a component of structural
knowledge. They are virtual cognitive structures consisting of our personal routines for
responding in a given context. Script processing is the action that takes place when there is a
situation generating cues and one recognizes the patterns formed by the cues. These patterns
include routines and serve to activate the appropriate action script. Once activated the action
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script proceeds, but also affects, and can change the ongoing situation. The more patterns one
has, the more action scripts will be available for use, and therefore more options will be available
for decision making and responses. This functionality of structural knowledge through action
scripts has important implications for dealing with unexpected events for individuals who posses
different levels of domain expertise.
Klein (1997, 2003) stated that once a pattern is recognized (or matches close enough), we
size up the situation, have a perspective on what cues are important and need to be monitored,
the goals we wish to make, and what to expect next. If the situation is familiar, then one’s
reaction is intuitive and script processing runs essentially automatically. In an unfamiliar or
ambiguous situation (e.g., not enough cues, conflicting cues, no pattern in memory), an option is
selected, and a “mental simulation” is run through one’s mental model of the situation which is
then assessed by the action script. If it seems like the option will work, the script processing
continues and a response is generated. If the option does not appear to be adequate, it is
discarded, and another action script is run through the process.
Domain experts and those well trained at a skill possess a larger and more varied repertoire
of candidate action scripts from which to choose in performing a task or responding to a
situation. However, this is not to say that experts always choose the appropriate cues to use or
ignore, nor do they necessarily know when it is necessary or prudent to change an action script.
The expert pilot with a strong schema regarding certain weather radar patterns may be less likely
to revise his course of action when evaluating weather than one with less weather experience and
perhaps a weaker “weather” schema. In this case, the pilot with less expertise may not have the
(perhaps erroneous) experience of flying through certain weather situations and although he has
fewer action scripts from which to choose, he shifts scripts and modifies his flight path to
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completely avoid the area of weather. Therefore, just possessing expertise in a field may not be
the only key to dealing successfully with the unexpected and indeed may at times be a hindrance
to one’s ability to shift the ongoing script.
Judgment Skills
The components of judgment skills which were considered in this study are presented in
Figure 2.

Cognitive
Flexibility
Judgment
Factors

Decision
Making
Skills

Metacognitive
Skills
Adaptive
Expertise

Judgment

Figure 2. Domain-independent factors involved in judgment.

Decision Making Strategies
An in-depth review of information processing and decision making theory is beyond the
scope of this paper. However, I briefly consider one pervasive idea found in judgment and
decision making literature; that there are two pathways available in decision making; analytic
versus intuitive. Often, the delineation between these modes of information processing and
response is based on the amount of attention and cognitive energy required to make a judgment
and respond to a given stimulus or situation. This short sidebar is necessary to the understanding
of the process of surprise because cue (information) processing depends on task condition
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variables, such as time available, uncertainty in the information, level of expertise, and one’s
cognitive flexibility (Orasanu, Martin, & Davison, 2001).
In this light, Hammond’s (2000) Cognitive Continuum Theory postulated that decisions
are made in response to a disruption in constancy, and that optimally, one would move along a
continuum from intuitive to analytic processes as the need arose due to the changing nature of
the task. The properties of intuitive decision making are low cognitive control, fast processing,
low attentional energy consumption, and low conscious awareness. Analysis incorporates high
cognitive control, slower processing, high conscious awareness, is task specific and when errors
occur, they are few, but large. Hammond also stated that it is often an unexpected event, which
demands immediate decisions and responses that drive decision making toward the intuition
end of the decision-making spectrum.
Cognitive Flexibility
Cognitive flexibility theory addresses the ability to quickly and accurately restructure the
current action script to adaptively respond to dynamic situations and the inevitable unexpected
event (Spiro, Coulson, Feltovich, & Anderson, 1988). Klein (2003) reiterated the need to be
flexible in the business arena where one should expect to have to improvise and have flexible
plans where “you can quickly jettison your planned sequence of actions and replace them with a
more appropriate reaction” (p. 163). However, this skill will not necessarily be helpful in
determining whether an event is indeed discrepant from the activated schema. One may have the
“feeling” or “know” something is amiss, but be unable to identify the problem due to lack of
domain expertise or knowledge. Therefore, the ability to verify an event as “unexpected” will not
necessarily be affected by one’s level of judgment.
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Furthermore, in training for unexpected or novel events, there is a potential to overproceduralize each training event. Research suggested there can be too much and too immersive
mission planning, creating an illusion that an individual has already experienced a particular
event and knows exactly the correct response (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). However, this is not
necessarily the case. For example, airline pilots train specifically for any number of “unexpected
events” such as windshear or wake turbulence. In reality, there are an infinite number of variants
of each event, making it highly unlikely that the exact response has ever been practiced. Similar
situations occur in business, where plans and procedures are often too specific to deal with the
subtle differences encountered in each situation. The optimum situation would be to have
adequate domain knowledge available, and to employ cognitive flexibility when evaluating the
cues presented from the event.
Adaptive Expertise
A domain expert’s knowledge, while organized around important ideas or concepts, is also
“conditionalized” which means there are specific contexts in which the available cues may be
useful (Fisher & Peterson, 2001). The variation, and at times deficiencies, in the flexible
application of knowledge to new situations may be due, in part, to the lack of attention “experts”
give to cues which are presented out-of-context. Alternatively, they may have such a strong
schema about the situation that decisions are made automatically, without much analysis. In this
case, a domain novice may find a workable solution from the cues available, regardless of
context, as they usually reason backward, using a set of possible decisions to the problem
description until the closest corresponding match is found. This gap in expert performance is
addressed through the concept of adaptive expertise.
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One view of the conditionalization or adaptability of expert skills is the Constraint
Attunement Hypothesis (Vicente & Wang, 1998). The researchers suggested that skill
acquisition is related to one’s adaptability to the constraints of the environment. They argued that
their “product” theory considers not only the cognitive components of expertise (as in process
theories), but the context of the performance as well. The purpose of their work was to
investigate the influence of the context on expert performance with one goal to determine if
experts are indeed more cognitively flexible (or inflexible) than novices. An interaction between
domain expertise and strategies used, based on the context, was found.
The question remains, however, as to where in the decision making process judgment skills
affect performance; and in what direction (helpful or hurtful). To answer this question may help
explain why domain experts sometimes make fatal errors. For example, a pilot may successfully
use a particular strategy (keeping the bank of the airliner shallow for passenger comfort) under a
given circumstance, only to find it is woefully inadequate in another situation (needing to use all
of the roll control of the airplane to recover from a wake turbulence encounter). According to
Hammond (2000), cognitive competence is twofold; subject matter or domain competence and,
separately, judgment and decision making competence. Domain competence is a function of
learning, memory, and deduction, while decision making is the execution and application of the
acquired domain knowledge. It is this idea of decision making competence, when coupled with
domain expertise that gives rise to adaptive expertise.
One trait differentiating adaptive experts from routine experts (those with expertise in one
area or lacking in judgment) is the ability of the former to perform well outside of their comfort
zone. They are able to deal with ambiguity and understand how their current beliefs and
assumptions may affect their understanding of a situation. Adaptive experts modify or invent
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new strategies in novel situations based on their current knowledge (Smith, Ford, & Kozlowski,
1997). To develop an adaptive expert, one must be taught to understand the underlying principles
of a task at a deeper level. This training will allow them to recognize situations that have
changed, or occur out of an expected context, and to select and combine various procedures in
order to effectively solve a problem (Spiro, Feltovich, Jackson, & Coulson, 1991).
In order to be trained as an adaptive expert, one must first acquire at least requisite
knowledge of the task domain (Smith, et al., 1997). Then, one must learn about themselves as
thinkers and problem solvers. Experts know what to do as well as what not to do in a situation. In
addition, adaptive experts not only use what they know, they monitor their current level of
understanding of a situation, continue to learn, and strive to move to a higher level of
functioning. They use each new situation as a challenge which provides a forum to facilitate
additional expertise.
According to Fisher and Peterson (2001), adaptive expertise is comprised of four separate
constructs; (a) multiple perspectives which is using more than one way of analyzing and solving
a problem; (b) metacognition; (c) learning goals and belief in success; and (d) epistemology or
one’s attitude toward gaining knowledge. That is to say, it takes a good measure of each of these
constructs to be an adaptive expert. Furthermore, this decomposition of a complex term specifies
measurable characteristics of an adaptive expert, such as metacognition.
Metacognition
Metacognition is the ability to monitor one's current level of understanding and decide
when it is and when it is not adequate. In other words, it is the awareness of one’s knowledge
and is a skill which can be used to control and manipulate cognitive processes. In order to
develop adaptive expertise, pilots need to understand how they think, and how what they
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currently know can usually be helpful, but at times can be detrimental. Metacognitive training
teaches decision makers to use general rather than specific strategies to optimize their judgment
and decision making processes in both familiar and unfamiliar situations (Jentsch, 1997).
Metacognitive training typically involves improving metacognitive monitoring and control
processes by teaching that (a) the meta-level exists and influences task processes, (b) describing
strategies to improve meta-level processes, and (c) gives trainees an opportunity to practice
thinking at this level. Metacognitive skills allow an individual to recognize novel or changing
situations, select responses to the situation, monitor and evaluate their own progress; and to
revise or create new strategies for responding to the task. One’s ability to script shift in response
to an unexpected event should become significantly better as their level of judgment improves
with the use of metacognitive skills. The next section will describe in detail the process model of
surprise which will be used to test these hypotheses.
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CHAPTER THREE: PREDICTING THE DIFFERENTIAL EFFECTS OF
DOMAIN EXPERTISE AND JUDGMENT
It has been established that the unexpected is a complex problem (Chapter 1), and there are
multiple skills (domain expertise and judgment) needed to best respond to the problem (Chapter
2). Now, I present evidence for the differential effects of domain expertise and judgment on the
way unexpected events are processed using a highly modified model, originally developed by
Meyer and colleagues (Meyer et al., 1997). Although this model has not been previously
validated empirically as a whole, research has demonstrated that some individual components
explain certain aspects of reactions to unexpected events (c.f. Meyer et al., 1997; Schützwohl,
1998). The approach of this study was to utilize the four main parts of this model (Parts A
through D) as a test platform for hypotheses regarding which factors associated with domain
expertise and judgment influence one’s ability to respond to an unexpected event.
Framework for the Study of Unexpected Events
Although this model (Figure 3) is quite complex, I will present it here in detail only to
provide necessary background information regarding the cognitive and behavioral aspects of the
process. The model is then summarized into four working parts; Assessment of Situation (Part
A), Schema Discrepancy Check (Part B), Discrepancy Verification (Part C), and Script
Switching Process (Part D). One must keep several key points in mind when considering the
process model of surprise used here. First, although portrayed sequentially, most of the steps in
the model are taking place simultaneously. In addition, most likely, more than one “event” is
being processed at the same time.
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Figure 3. Process model adapted from Meyer, Reisenzein, & Schützwohl (1997).
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Second, a host of interpersonal, social, and environmental factors such as training,
experience, expertise, attention, motivation, heuristics, framing (context), biases, (cue
processing) influence the process from beginning to end (Mauro, Barshi, Pederson, & Bruininks,
2001). For example, one’s state and trait personality factors such as risk perception, risk
assessment, and risk taking behaviors influence the process at many junctures (Lubner, Hellman,
Struening, & Hwoschinsky, 1999; Orasanu et al., 2001). Finally, national, organizational, and
industry cultural norms also affect how one deals with an unexpected event (Helmreich &
Wilhelm, 1997).
The Process Model – Part A
Assessment of Situation
The first section (Part A) of this conceptual process model deals with the physical
properties and the perception of the cues available in the environment. During this input phase,
humans continuously perceive internal and external cues in the environment relating to objects,
scenes, and events.
Cue (Information) Processing
Cues in the environment are initially processed for their physical properties. The physical
properties of the cues (salience, number, placement, color, brightness, tone, etc.) and many
psychophysiological aspects of sensory processing, affect one’s ability to detect discrepant
events. Cue processing is subtly influenced by learned and innate covert biases which will be
discussed in detail as components of expectation.
One particularly important factor in this first stage of the process, as reported by Kochan et
al. (2004) and others (Rickard & Bajic, 2004; Spratling & Johnson, 2004; Weick & Stucliffe,
2001; Wickens, 2003) was that more often than not, there were cues available which, if
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considered, would have provided sufficient information to preclude a situation from being
perceived as unexpected. The question then arises as to what might be the deciding factor in
whether a cue is noticed and brought into the decision making process or discarded as irrelevant
information. If domain experts have a wider selection of patterns suitable to an appropriate
action script, then their recognition of a changed situation should be faster than with less domain
expertise. However, experience in a field would also tend to strengthen the schemata germane to
the domain tasks (Schützwohl, 1998). Therefore, subtle or weak cues may be discarded as
irrelevant noise because there was a “close enough” fit to an existing, known pattern, and a close
scrutiny of all information was not forthcoming (Klein, 1997, 2003).
Perception
Returning to Part A of the model, we will next consider the concept of perception which I
consider becoming aware of something via the senses. All internal and external sensory input
(cue processing) is perceived through the filter of one’s current physical state, mental state,
mental model (Klein, 2003), and currently activated schemata (Meyer et al., 1997). Perception
will be tempered by perceptual biases and other expectations. Neuroscientific studies (Kagan,
2002) have also demonstrated that people with more experience in a certain domain and
therefore people more likely to have diverse experiences, may not have the same type of reaction
(e.g., surprise) to an event as those with no exposure to the same situation.
Currently Activated Schemata
This process model is based on the premise that humans maintain a set of schemata which
are personal, informal knowledge structures representing internal and external, events, objects, or
situations. Currently activated schemata would be those which pertain to the ongoing situation or
task. When an unexpected event is encountered, this activated schema (or schemata) is the
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benchmark to which an evaluation of the event is made as to whether it fits with the situation.
During this evaluation, one’s training, experience, and the strength of the activated schema
dictates which cues are considered useful information or disregarded as non-essential (Orasanu,
et al., 2001).
Script Processing
Script processing activities are continuous and based on the current, ongoing state of a
situation. If an unexpected stimulus has been presented, the ongoing script processing is
temporarily interrupted while the new cues are perceived and processed. Although not
necessarily conscious at this point, there are significant changes taking place in the cognitive
activities of the script processing (Damasio, 1999; Kagan, 2002). Again, depending on training,
priming, emotional state, and other biasing factors, the unexpected event which is sufficiently
discrepant from the currently activated schema will allow the process to continue. Otherwise, the
feedback loop will be activated and “routine” processing will continue.
Expertise and Assessment of the Situation Hypotheses
The most salient features of this part of the model are one’s perception, recognition, and
utilization of the cues available in the environment. Based on the evidence of one’s response to
surprise at this stage, the following hypotheses regarding the differential effects of domain
expertise and judgment on the assessment of the situation are depicted in Figure 4 and were put
forth:
Hypothesis 1a: One’s ability to assess the unexpected situation covaries with one’s level
of domain expertise. This was predicted because of the increased availability of facts and
organization of facts in memory should allow for better cue recognition and cue usage.
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Hypothesis 1b: Judgment has no significant influence or may negatively influence one’s
assessment of a situation. If one possesses exceptional adaptive expertise (a component of
judgment), but does not have the requisite domain knowledge, there may be a tendency to
overlook important cues.
Hypothesis 1c: There will be no significant interaction between the effects of domain
expertise and judgment on one’s assessment of the situation.
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Figure 4. Hypotheses regarding the effects of domain expertise and judgment on the assessment
of an unexpected event.

The Process Model – Part B
Schema Discrepancy Check

As in all decision making and information processing models, the process is influenced by
a multitude of environmental and individual differences variables. Some of these influences,
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such as covert and perceptual biases serve to change the process of surprise through an
interaction effect as it evolves (moderates) (Friedman, Cycowicz, & Gaeta, 2001). Other
variables, such as contextual surrounds and perceived probabilities, can have an indirect effect
on the outcome, but do not materially change the internal cognitive processes (mediators)
(Fletcher, et al, 2001). Variables associated with one’s expectations have the potential to impact
reactions to surprise at every stage of processing as they serve to bias one’s perception and
understanding of the information available.
Expectations
Expectations are a part of the planning, predicting, and decision making processes used by
all individuals in everyday life. Some scientists (e.g., Kagan, 2002) even purport that one feature
distinguishing humans from other primates is the ability to formulate predications about future
events based on desired goals in the distant future. Expectations are embedded in the cognitive
networks formed by semantic representations, schemata (personally held views about how things
should be), and action scripts (the dynamic ongoing process about how situations should unfold)
used in assessing risk, formulating predictions, and choosing responses to an event.
The degree of expectedness is determined, in part, by how congruent or incongruent an
event is with one’s view of what should be. When situations do not proceed as one expects, a
chain of physiological, emotional, and sociological events take place (Hammond, 2000, Jones &
Endsley, 2000; Meyer et al., 1997). The resultant condition is a state of surprise which,
depending on the valance and strength, can be extremely disruptive in virtually any domain. I
will next consider the specific factors comprising expectations.
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Cue Priming
Cue priming deals with the bottom-up processing of the sensory information presented in
the unexpected event (Spratling & Johnson, 2004). Cue priming increases the sensitivity of a
cue by improving the perceptual discrimination of the object (Colagrosso, Mozer & Huber,
2004).
Covert Biases
Depending on the strength of the activated schema and current ongoing action script, the
discrepant information may or may not be interpreted as unexpected or even worthy of
consideration. This initial, nonconscious processing has been shown to a priori influence the
accurate processing of sensory information. The research team of Bechura, Damasio, Tranel, and
Damasio (1997) has demonstrated a covert biasing effect which influences decision making in
much the same way as other learned or innate biases. These covert biases work to influence the
facts, options for decisions, projection of future outcomes, and reasoning strategies due to an
individual’s past emotional experience in similar situations. For example, a pilot’s negative
emotional experience with an event (e.g. rejected landing) can inflate how unexpected an event
may appear. This causes the mechanism of surprise to become activated when it may not, in fact,
be a particularly discrepant event for the ongoing situation. An abundance of good judgment
could help mitigate this type of reaction by use of one’s cognitive flexibility.
Perceptual Biases
Perceptual biases interact with covert biases to influence cue processing. Behavioral
evidence of perceptual biases was presented by Kahneman (2003), who addressed how and why
certain informational cues are noticed and others are not by considering accessibility. The dualprocess (intuition versus reasoning) model of decision making proposed by Kahneman and
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Tversky (1984) and revised by Kahneman (2003) revealed the core concept of accessibility.
Accessibility determines how easily a thought comes to mind and is “determined jointly by the
characteristics of the cognitive mechanisms that produce it and by the characteristics of the
stimuli and events that evoke it” (p. 699). The accessibility dimension (more or less accessible)
can be applied to the attributes of an object, the different objects in a scene, and the different
aspects and cues available in a situation. The concept of accessibility includes the influences of
heuristics (e.g., availability, representativeness), cue features, associative activation, priming,
selective attention, and specific training which have all been demonstrated to affect both intuitive
and analytical decision making (Connolly, Arkes, & Hammond, 2000; Jensen, 1995; Kahneman,
2003; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Klein, Orasanu, Calderwood, & Zsambok, 1993).
This study approached the cognitive difficulties apparent in responding to the unexpected
keeping in mind that two, possibly competing, pathways leading to a decision are active at the
same time as summarized by Kahneman (2003). He concluded his discussion on accessibility
with the proposition that most judgments and preferences are initiated by intuitive action, based
on the accessibility of information; unless that action is deliberately modified, corrected, or
overridden by analytic reasoning. Domain experts should have access to more information than
non-experts should, however in the case of the unexpected, intuitive reasoning may not serve to
be the best process. Perhaps those less expert in a domain must analyze the situation more
carefully as they do not have enough background facts and experiences to get a “feel” for the
situation. This analysis of the event may indeed lead them to an appropriate change of plans
(script shift); whereas the intuitive path may not indicate that, the ongoing script is no longer
useful.
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Framing
Contextual priming is based on a top-down, attention dependent bias toward information
that is believed to be most relevant to the desired behavior. Spratling and Johnson (2004)
explained the biasing effects generated by feedback mechanisms from cognitive processes on
contextually primed target locations or objects. Features in a congruent context caused a stronger
neural response and the resulting feedback mechanism increased the strength of the perceptual
processing bottom-up signal resulting in a faster recognition. A response delay was also observed
when one feature of a cue was as expected (as framed), and another was unexpected; for
example, an air traffic controller may expect a target in a certain location (latitude and
longitude), however the aircraft’s altitude may not be as expected (Handy, Green, Klein, &
Mangun, 2001). Contextual expectations will naturally be strengthen by repeated experience in a
domain, perhaps causing a higher degree of surprise when an event occurs out of the expected
context.
Perceived Probability of Event
One’s expectation of an event is assumed to be a function of the perceived probability of
an event occurring at any time and the average probability of that event occurring. The level of
expectation is also assumed to be mediated by the base rate of the event. Consequently, when the
perceived probability of an event occurring is greater than or equal to the average perceived
probability of that event as mediated by the base rate, one would consider the event
“unexpected”. Domain expertise will again have an influence on the perceived probability of an
event; however, one’s perception of probabilities will not necessarily be statistically correct (‘it
will never happen to me’ syndrome). This will also potentially skew one’s perception of the
unexpectedness of an event.

28

Appraisal of Unexpectedness
Meyer et al. (1997) stated that as long as the activated schemata and the events (cues)
perceived are congruent (enough), one interprets the event and automatically executes the
appropriate action scripts and continues ongoing processing.
Threshold for Discrepancy
Events are measured against an individual’s threshold for discrepancy as determined by
their personal schema for the situation. When a discrepancy of sufficient strength is detected
between the currently activated schemata and one’s perception of the situational cues, the
process continues.
Expertise and Schema Discrepancy Check Hypotheses
Expectations, framing, and priming will all contribute to one’s analysis of whether an
event is sufficiently discrepant from the ongoing situation. The hypotheses, displayed in Figure
5, were based on the previously presented evidence regarding the mechanisms involved in
estimating the likelihood of an event and one’s schema strength.
Hypothesis 2a: The correct identification of an event as discrepant may decrease as
domain expertise increases due to a stronger schema and erroneous probability estimate.
Hypothesis 2b: Judgment will have no significant influence on the correct identification of
an event as discrepant as the ability to determine whether an event is surprising is based on
domain expertise factors of probability estimates and schema strength.
Hypothesis 2c: There will be no significant interaction between the effects of domain
expertise and judgment on one’s identifying an event as discrepant.
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Figure 5. Hypotheses regarding the effects of domain expertise and judgment on the schema
discrepancy check.
Process Model – Part C
Discrepancy Verification
State of Surprise
When situations do not meet one’s expectations, a chain of physiological, emotional, and
sociological events take place (Damasio, et al, 2000; Hammond, 2000; Jones & Endsley, 2000;
Meyer et al., 1997), known generally as the emotion of surprise. Some researchers hypothesized
that unexpected events are viewed as unpleasant experiences because they reduce the
predictability of the environment, and one feels less control over the given situation (Weick &
Sutcliffe, 2001), or destabilizes the homeostasis of the organism (Hammond, 2000). Other
neuroscientists (e.g., Damasio, 1999; LeDoux, 2002) described the interdependence of emotions
(including surprise) and cognition as having the ability to be considered in a positive or negative
light, based on the impact of the situation to the survival of the organism.
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This view was supported by empirical evidence provided by Schützwohl (1998) who found
that the resultant feeling of the emotion of surprise, can have either a motivating (positive) or
petrifying (negative) effect, depending on the extent of the discrepancy of the event with what is
expected based on the currently activated schema. Additionally, the research team of Mauro,
Barshi, Pederson, and Bruininks (2001), has suggested that the degree of unexpectedness elicits
different affective and cognitive reactions. It appears that mildly discrepant events are viewed as
pleasantly surprising, while excessively discrepant and novel events cause unpleasantness thus
creating the possibility for more severe or longer lasting interruptions of ongoing processes. For
example, most pilots tend to enjoy a moderate challenge of their skills and knowledge, and will
find a minor surprise a welcome challenge. However, a major disaster, extreme inflight upset, or
novel unexpected event will often be met with fear reactions including the lack of immediate
response.
Interruption of Ongoing Activities
The duration of one’s fixation on an unexpected event resulting in an interruption of
ongoing activities will play a large part in the outcome of the event (Handy et al., 2001). The
time spent focusing on the event may be influenced by the strength of the schemata pertaining to
the situation (Schützwohl, 1998) where it may take longer to process a discrepant piece of
information (cue), with increasingly strong schemata. An event with a smaller expected
probability may also result in a longer fixation. For example, a previously unnoticed target on an
air traffic controller’s radar screen may elicit a state of fixation and while their focus is on this
intruder, the rest of the screen is neglected. If, in addition, this is a target type with a very low
probability of showing on the radar screen, the neglect of the ongoing processes may be even
longer.
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Reallocation of Attentional Resources
Wickens (2003) suggested many aviation accidents are triggered by highly unusual, and
therefore, unexpected events. The unwanted outcomes are often the result of misallocation of
attentional resources due to the response mechanisms associated with an unexpected event.
Another factor, discussed by Woods and Patterson (2001), is that unexpected events often occur
due to the mismanagement of automated functions in the aircraft. Once the event has occurred,
there is an increasing escalation of cognitive activity, and coordination demands, leading to the
likelihood of even more errors. It was expected that unique and separate contributions from
domain and judgment abilities will be found to influence the level of interruption of ongoing
processes.
Responses to Unexpected Events
Action Delay
Differences in response selection may be related to the ability of a pilot to modify or
change schemata (or switch action scripts) based on the new situation. According to Meyer, et
al. (1997), this would result in a longer action delay for dealing with the event and returning to
other duties. The length of this delay may influence the ultimate outcome of an event, and once
again, it may be controlled by one’s level of domain expertise and/or judgment skills.
Analysis and Evaluation of Unexpected Event
Once an event is perceived as unexpected, four additional sub-processes occur: (a) schema
discrepancy verification to determine that the discrepancy is real; (b) analysis as to the cause of
the event; (c) assessment of the relevance of the event to determine its effect for ongoing action;
and (d) risk assessment and analysis. This analysis and evaluation portion of the model
correlates with the analysis side of the intuition/analysis decision making dichotomy
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(Hammond, 2000; Kahneman, 2003).

The next step in the process model depends on the

outcome of these sub-process analyses, combined with any other pertinent assessment of the
situation, such as company values and cultural norms. Indeed, even at this stage, the discrepant
cues may be deemed irrelevant or not applicable to the current situation and therefore
disregarded; at which point normal processing continues.
Expertise and Discrepancy Verification Hypotheses
Once an event has been determined to be unexpected, an interruption of ongoing processes
of some duration will be displayed. The benefits of high levels and good structure to one’s
domain knowledge will assist in this stage of the process. Those with less domain expertise may
create a length of action delay that contributes to an unwanted outcome due to inattention to the
ongoing task. High levels of judgment are not expected to assist significantly at this juncture,
although some evidence of an interaction effect may be found as shown in Figure 6.
Hypothesis 3a: Discrepant event verification will be less disruptive to ongoing processes
as domain expertise increases due to the increasing levels of automaticity for ongoing skills and
the familiarity with possible alternatives.
Hypothesis 3b: Discrepant event verification will improve significantly with increased
judgment due to the increasing ability to search for alternatives which may not be obvious.
Hypothesis 3c: There will be a significant interaction between the effects of domain
expertise and judgment on one’s verification of a discrepancy. High levels of judgment will
assist those with low levels of domain expertise more than those with high levels of domain
expertise in event verification through the increased ability to search for and consider different
alternatives.
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Figure 6. Hypotheses regarding the effects of domain expertise and judgment on discrepancy
verification.

Process Model – Part D
Script Switching Process
Script Shift
According to Schützwohl (1998), the strength of the activated schemata and the degree of
perceived unexpectedness interact to initiate a transformation of the schema or to reject the
input. However, modification of a schema would, in theory, require many instances of the same
event, whereas updating or creating a new script for the situation would be more likely.
Maintaining the ability to continually evaluate a situation and modify or change action scripts
as necessary is key to dealing with unexpected events. It is also critical in situations with
degraded information, too much noise, or ill-structured problem domains that the most relevant
available cues are utilized to determine if a script shift is indeed warranted.
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Response Selection and Execution
Response selection is selecting the choice of response from the candidate actions. The
decision to take action or decline any immediate action results in the selected response. This
response follows a feedback loop to continue processing, which is essentially the sub-process of
evaluating the choice and execution of the response.
Expertise and Script Switching Process Hypotheses
This is the most critical stage of the process model for the effect of judgment (Figure 7).
Here, the highest levels of domain expertise may only serve to bias one into thinking the
situation does not need to be addressed, while possessing cognitive flexibility and adaptive
expertise skills (judgment) brings to light the need for a shift in the action script.
Hypothesis 4a: One’s ability to script shift will be unrelated, or may even be negatively
related to their level of domain expertise due to their stronger schemas and higher use of intuitive
decision making styles.
Hypothesis 4b: One’s ability to script shift will be significantly better as their level of
judgment increases as this task is primarily a cognitive task and domain non-specific.
Hypothesis 4c: There will be a significant interaction between the effects of domain
expertise and judgment on one’s ability to script shift. High levels of judgment are expected to
mitigate the potential negative effects of high domain expertise and enhance the ability to script
shift for those with low levels of domain expertise through the application of cognitive
flexibility and metacognitive skills.
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Figure 7. Hypotheses regarding the effects of domain expertise and judgment on the script
switching process.

Summary
It is apparent that the effects of unexpected or novel events can be detrimental to an
individual’s cognitive and behavioral processes. Of greatest consequence appears to be the action
delay that takes time and attention away from ongoing tasks, potentially leading to an unwanted
and likely dangerous outcome. However, relatively little research exists on the specific effects of
unexpected on cognitive or behavioral processes. Research such as this study was needed to
determine the effects of dealing with the unexpected on human performance and the potential for
improving responses to unexpected events. The main theme of this investigation was that
training involving judgment skills such as cognitive flexibility, metacognitive skills, and
adaptability may be the first step to addressing the underlying skills necessary to be able to better
respond to the unexpected.
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Hypotheses

Four sets of hypotheses were proposed, each describing how domain expertise and/or
judgment play a part in the steps of the processes generated by an unexpected event. It was
through the empirical testing of these hypotheses that I attempted to answer the research
questions posed in this study. Can we identify specific knowledges and skills which enhanced
one’s ability to deal with unexpected events? Furthermore, were these skills included in domain
expertise and/or judgment? Did domain expertise improve or deter one’s reaction and response to
unexpected events? What role did judgment play in responding to the event? The specific
hypotheses are reiterated below.
Hypothesis 1a: One’s ability to assess the unexpected situation covaries with one’s level
of domain expertise. This was predicted because of the increased availability of facts and
organization of facts in memory should allow for better cue recognition and cue usage.
Hypothesis 1b: Judgment has no significant influence or may negatively influence one’s
assessment of a situation. If one possesses exceptional adaptive expertise (a component of
judgment), but does not have the requisite domain knowledge, there may be a tendency to
overlook important cues.
Hypothesis 1c: There will be no significant interaction between the effects of domain
expertise and judgment on one’s assessment of the situation.
Hypothesis 2a: The correct identification of an event as discrepant may decrease as
domain expertise increases due to a stronger schema and erroneous probability estimate.
Hypothesis 2b: Judgment will have no significant influence on the correct identification of
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an event as discrepant as the ability to determine whether an event is surprising is based on
domain expertise factors of probability estimates and schema strength.
Hypothesis 2c: There will be no significant interaction between the effects of domain
expertise and judgment on one’s identifying an event as discrepant.
Hypothesis 3a: Discrepant event verification will be less disruptive to ongoing processes as
domain expertise increases due to the increasing levels of automaticity for ongoing skills and
the familiarity with possible alternatives.
Hypothesis 3b: Discrepant event verification will improve significantly with increased
judgment due to the increasing ability to search for alternatives which may not be obvious.
Hypothesis 3c: There will be a significant interaction between the effects of domain
expertise and judgment on one’s verification of a discrepancy. High levels of judgment will
assist those with low levels of domain expertise more than those with high levels of domain
expertise in event verification through the increased ability to search for and consider different
alternatives.
Hypothesis 4a: One’s ability to script shift will be unrelated, or may even be negatively
related to their level of domain expertise due to their stronger schemas and higher use of intuitive
decision making styles.
Hypothesis 4b: One’s ability to script shift will be significantly better as their level of
judgment increases as this task is primarily a cognitive task and domain non-specific.
Hypothesis 4c: There will be a significant interaction between the effects of domain
expertise and judgment on one’s ability to script shift. High levels of judgment are expected to
mitigate the potential negative effects of high domain expertise and enhance the ability to script
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shift for those with low levels of domain expertise through the application of cognitive
flexibility and metacognitive skills.
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CHAPTER FOUR: METHOD
Overview of Research Protocol
This study was conducted in an aviation context, as it represents a highly complex domain
replete with innumerable unexpected and surprising events. The data collection and
analyses were part of an ongoing training and research study on pilots’ reactions to unexpected
events. As part of an FAA-sponsored program performed by the Calspan Corporation, pilots
participated in a three-day upset recovery
training

program

Questionnaires,

in

Roswell,

knowledge

tests,

NM.
and

interviews were administered to determine
expertise levels. Each pilot participant also
flew a sortie in a Learjet in-flight simulator
(Figure 8). They flew the airplane from the

Figure 8. In-flight simulator Learjet.

right seat (Figure 9), with a test-pilot
instructor administering the experimental
scenario from the left seat. Objective,
subjective, and qualitative data from the
participants

and

the

instructor

pilots,

collected during and after the flight, were
used as performance indicators of each step
in the process of surprise. A description of
Figure 9. In-flight simulator Learjet cockpit.
the study protocol is provided in Appendix
A.
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Experimental Stimuli
The experimental flight scenario was designed to allow for the introduction of unexpected
events which have been demonstrated to elicit surprise. Pilots are surprised by these selected
events, regardless of their experience level or prior training (Kochan & Priest, 2005).
Furthermore, even though the pilots were well aware of the nature of the flight (they were
participating in an upset recovery training program and this was the pre-test flight), the events
were still (quite) novel enough to create surprise. The in-flight simulation technology, employed
in this study, allowed for the initiation of the events via an onboard computer, so as to
realistically replicate an unexpected event. The experimental flight and stimuli were constructed
to allow data collection and foster measurements at each of the four stages in the process model
of surprise (assessment of the situation, schema discrepancy check, discrepancy verification, and
script switching process). The stimuli in this experiment were three aerodynamic events (pitch,
roll, and yaw) representative of airplane upset situations which have led to loss-of-control
accidents (Kochan, Priest, & Moskal, 2005). The experimental flight incorporated the following
unexpected events.
Pitch Aerodynamic Event
The first event was a simulated runaway stabilizer trim that required the use of full forward
elevator control and considerable bank to stop the pitch up. The optimum recovery would have
included full use of pitch control, ask for assistance on the controls, call for approriate checklist,
and use enough bank angle to control the pitch attitude.
Roll Aerodynamic Event
A roll event that required large aileron inputs to recover, which airline pilots are not used
to doing, was presented next. Some rudder input may also be required for the optimum recovery.
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In this case it was better to increase the load-factor on the airplane (pull-back) and slow down. If
proficient in recovering from this event, a participant could verify that loading is preferable to
unloading, and whether rudder or asymmetric thrust would be required to control the
uncommanded roll.
Yaw Aerodynamic Event
The third event was a yaw anomoly which should have elicited a rudder input from the
participant. The failure was such that the rudder input had no effect, so the yaw rapidly caused a
roll rate due to dihedral effect. The roll had to be countered with aileron and unloading assisted
in controlling the roll until airspeed was increased or asymmetric thrust was applied. At higher
levels of proficiency, the participants could demonstrate techniques to control the instantaneous
crossover speed.
Experimental Design
This study was a quasi-experimental methodology involving the study of operational pilots
in a simulated, in-flight, operational environment. The research plan called for a 2 (low expertise
vs. high expertise) x 2 (low judgment vs. high judgment) between participants design as shown
in Table 2.
Table 2
Experimental Design

Expertise Type and Level

Low Judgment

Low Domain (LD)

LD-LJ

LD-HJ

High Domain (HD)

HD-LJ

HD-HJ
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(LJ)

High Judgment (HJ)

Participants
Participants were volunteers recruited from the larger study participant pool and held at
least an FAA Commercial Pilot Certificate with an Instrument Rating. All pilots were current for
flying instruments and held an FAA Medical Certificate.
Power analysis suggested that using a minimum of 28 participants (alpha = .05, beta =
.95) for an effect size (d) of 1.25 at the power of .80 would have required very robust differences
between the study groups. The percent variance in scores accounted for by differences in
expertise levels would have to be approximately 28% for main effects; and 33% for any
interaction effect. Calculations followed guidance from Murphy and Myors (2004) which
showed the sample size would need to be increased to at least 125 in order to detect smaller
effect sizes (approximately .10) at power of .80. Therefore, given the high cost per participant
($10,000), initial analyses were conducted with data sets from 46 participants, randomly selected
from the 209 available. Final analyses used the available complete data sets from 33 participants.
Materials and Procedures
Copies of the experimental materials and instructions for their use are in Appendix B.
Participants were onsite at a designated training facility to participate in the study. After greeting
the participants, they were asked to fill out the informed consent and demographic forms. A brief
explanation of the protocol was given. They then completed the metacognitive self-efficacy
questionnaire and a knowledge quiz on upset recovery causes and procedures. A Learjet preflight
safety briefing was given and the experimental flight administered. Instructor pilots completed
forms which provided performance and additional input to the experimental measures. Detailed
protocols and scenario scripts are displayed in Appendix C.
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Informed Consent
This proposed research was conducted under the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 45,
“Public Welfare – Department of Health and Human Services”, Part 46 “Protection of Human
Subjects” (45 CFR 46) as revised 13 November 2001. The research proposal was submitted to
the University of Central Florida’s Institutional Review Board for approval (see Appendix B).
Each participant in the study was presented with an informed consent document to read and sign.
Participation in the study was voluntary and the experimental activities did not interfere nor
impact ongoing pilot training. Participants were free to decline or discontinue participation at any
time without any negative consequences. There were no undue risks associated with
participation. A thorough debriefing was offered at the conclusion of the experiment.
Measures
Independent Variables
The independent measures in this study were domain expertise and judgment skills. Table
3 outlines the operationalization of these constructs. The details of the indicator variables used in
the study are presented below.
Operationalizing the Domain “Expert Pilot”
One dilemma facing this study was how to define and operationalize the “expert pilot.”
Although the qualities of an expert pilot can be listed (Kochan, Jensen, Chubb, & Hunter, 1997),
it was necessary to delineate the pilots with higher levels of domain expertise from those with
lower levels of domain expertise to facilitate hypothesis testing. General pilot expertise level was
determined by a mathematical formula developed pursuant to a factor analytic study by Doane,
Sohn, and Jodlowski (2004). A general pilot expertise (experience level) score was calculated as
an average of the z-scores for flight hours; years flying experience; number of types of aircraft
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flown; and flight instructor activity. The score was calculated using information reported on the
Demographics Form. Specific domain knowledge (upset recoveries) was captured by a paper and
pencil knowledge test and instructor evaluations (see Appendix B). These scores were converted
to z-scores and averaged to be used in the data analysis. The general domain scores were
calculated with consideration to be used as a covariate.
Table 3
Descriptions of Independent Variables

Independent Variable

Domain Expertise

Judgment

Level (Designation)

Example Description

Low (LD)

Low demonstrated level of declarative,
procedural, and structural knowledge on
written test; low instructor ratings

High (HD)

Higher demonstrated level of declarative,
procedural, and structural knowledge

Low (LJ)

Indicated by cognitive rigidity; lack of
adaptive expertise skills, does not employ
alternate strategies, weak in strategic
knowledge

High (HJ)

Indicated by high level of cognitive
flexibility; ability to employ alternate
strategies; strong in strategic knowledge

Operationalization of “Judgment”
The construct of judgment was operationalized by measures of metacognition using paper
and pencil instruments (Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004; Pintrich, Smith, Garcia, &
McKeachie, 1993), adaptive expertise through pretest and post-test self-efficacy (Schmidt &
Ford, 2001), and cognitive flexibility (mindfulness) (Klein, 2003). The instruments and scoring
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procedure used are exhibited in Appendix B. Scores from the individual measures were
standardized (z-scores) and summed for a total judgment score. High vs. low judgment, as
described in Table 3, was determined by median split of the judgment factors composite scores.
Dependent Variables
The experimental plan called for multiple data collection techniques to be used for each of
the dependent measures in the study. To best address the proposed hypotheses and minimize
threats to scientific validity, a mixture of objective, subjective, and self-report measures were
used.
Assessment of Situation
Assessment of situation (Part A) was determined by measures of the participant’s ability to
recognize the event. The measures used for the variable were a combined score of 0-1 for “event
recognition” for each of the three events and an overall instructor rating (Poor = 1 to Excellent =
5) of the participants’ monitoring of the environment for changes, trends, and abnormal
conditions. These measures were selected to provide multiple sources of information regarding
the participant’s situation monitoring, from a very specific event perspective and a more general
view (overall monitoring). Cronbach’s alpha for these four measures was .59. An average z-score
was calculated from the mean of the event z-score and the instructor rating z-score.
Schema Discrepancy Check
The dependent variable score for Schema Discrepancy Check (Part B) was composed of
the average of the time to recognize the three events as scored by Immediate = 3, Delayed = 2,
and Excessive = 1. The scale was designed after observing approximately 100 similar event
recoveries from prior studies. From these observations it was clear that the pilot (a) immediately
recognized the event and responded (between .5 – 1 seconds); (b) initially hesitated, but was still
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able to react (approximately 2-5 seconds); or (c) was quite delayed in determining the
discrepancy (over 6 seconds). Cronbach’s Alpha was .89 for these three items. The average score
was converted to a z-score value.
Discrepancy Verification
There were seven measures used for the score of the variable Discrepancy Verification
(Part C). The verbalization of each event was scored as yes (1) or no (0) based on whether the
participant announced the event. In addition, a score of initial recovery input correctness for each
of the three events was given with Yes = 2, Somewhat Correct = 1, and Incorrect or No Input =
0. A z-score average of the verbalization, plus a z-score average of the initial recovery input was
added to a z-score of the overall instructor evaluation of the participant’s verbally
communicating the correct nature of the event (Strongly Disagree = 1 to Strongly Agree = 5) for
the total score. I chose these measures in order to include multiple facets of the pilot’s
discrepancy verification indications; verbalization and demonstration. These items (measures)
showed a Cronbach’s Alpha of .80. The variable score was an average z-score of the mean initial
recovery input z-score, the mean announcement of the event z-score, and the instructor’s
evaluation z-score.
Script Switching Process
Participants’ scores on Script Switching (Part D) was calculated by averaging their ability
to recover, based on the instructors scores which ranged from Recovered = 2, Recovered with
Difficulty = 1, and No Recovery = 0 and the instructor’s rating of the participant’s overall
performance on the tasks (Poor = 1 to Excellent = 5). Once again, these measures were chosen
based on previous observations of recoveries (approximately 100) and to provide more than one
source of data in determining the value for the script switching variable. These items had a
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Cronbach’s Alpha of .78. These scores were converted to z-scores and an average of these zscores was used in the analyses.
A summary of the description of the operationalization of the dependent variable
constructs and measurement techniques employed to test the hypotheses are listed in Table 4.
Table 4
Operationalization of Constructs of Interest and Measure of Dependent Variables

Dependent Variable

Construct of Interest

Measure

Assessment of Situation

Cue Recognition (Time)

Cue recognition

Assessment of Situation

Cues Observed

Instructor rating of participant’s
assessment of situation

Schema Discrepancy Check Schema Strength

Past history of similar events; prior
upset recovery training; time in type
(large, transport aircraft)

Schema Discrepancy Check Action Delay

Time from perceiving event to action

Discrepancy Verification

Confirms Event

Verbalization of event and instructor
rating of communication of events

Discrepancy Verification

Confirms Event

Initial response input

Script Switching Process

Change of Plan

Adequacy of recovery

Script Switching Process

Change Level

Ability to carry-out counterintuitive
procedures (e.g., push forward on
yoke to unstall airplane when
pointed straight down
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Data Collection
The data collection instruments used in this study are outlined in Table 5. The
explicit purpose of each data collection form was de-identified after pre-testing with forms which
had the “actual” name of the instrument displayed. Comments from the instructor pilots and
participants pre-testing the forms had indicated the form names were distracting. I was also
asked many questions regarding the forms’ use and purpose when the descriptive names were
displayed. Therefore, the form name as administered to the participants was not indicative of the
constructs being measured. De-identified videos from each experimental flight were also
reviewed and objectively evaluated for consistency by this author, also a qualified upset recovery
instructor. A “Lear Instructor Card #1” and “Lear Instructor Survey #1” were completed while
observing the videos and compared to the real-time scores assigned by the instructor pilots. No
inconsistencies were found. Inter-rater reliability (Pearson r) was greater than .96.
Table 5
Description of Data Collection Forms, Measures, and Administration

Form Name
Participant
Experience and
Flight Time

Participant
Survey #1

Participant
Survey #2

Description and Purpose
-“Participant Experience and
Flight Time”
-To gather demographic and
flight experience information
from the participants
-“Self-Efficacy and
Metacognitive Score #1”
-Used to ascertain how well
participants think they will
perform and what they think
-“Self-Efficacy and
Metacognitive Score #2”
-Used to ascertain how well
participants think they
performed and how they
thought about the task

When to
Administer and to
Whom

How to Administer
and Explain

-Participant
completes prior to
start of Training

-Send prior to training
or have participant
complete upon arrival
-Instructions on form

-Participant
completes just prior
to Lear Pretest flight

-Hand form to
participant after filling
out informed consent

-Participant
completes just after
Lear Pretest flight

-Hand form to
participant at the end of
Pretest Lear flight

49

When to
Administer and to
Whom

Form Name

Description and Purpose

Participant
Procedures
Survey

-“Participant Knowledge Quiz”
- Used to assess declarative
and procedural knowledge
regarding upset recoveries

-Participant
completes after all
academics

Lear Instructor
Card #1

-“Lear Instructor Card
Pretest”
-Used to gather information
on anxiety level and pilot
performance on pretest upset
maneuvers during Lear flight
-“Beginning Upset Recovery
Quality Rating Scale”
-Used to evaluate quality of
upset recoveries
-“Ending Upset Recovery
Quality Rating Scale”
-Used to evaluate quality of
upset recoveries

-Instructor completes
after Lear Pretest
flight (immediately
after Lear flight)

Upset Recovery
Quality Rating
Scale
Upset Recovery
Quality Rating
Scale

Lear Instructor
Survey

Debriefing
Survey

DVD

CD-ROM

-Lear “Situational Awareness
Linked Instances Adapted to
Novel Tasks” (SALIANT),
mindfulness measure
-Used to gather information
on the pilot’s situation
awareness during the flight
-“Experimenter Debriefing
Survey”
-Used to gather additional
information regarding
retention of training and views
on loss of control
-Audio and video recording of
the computer generated
instrument display in Learjet
-Used for data extraction after
flight
-Flight history
- Records parameters such
as attitude, airspeed, altitude,
control surfaces, pilot control
inputs, and control law values
at 100 frames per second.

-Participant
completes (with
assistance) before
Lear Pretest flight
-Participant
completes (with
Instructor
assistance) after
each Lear flight
-Instructor completes
just after each Lear
flight

-Experimenter
verbally administers
to participant after all
training activities are
complete or via
telephone
-Archive with data

-Archive with data
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How to Administer
and Explain
-Hand form to
participant at the end of
academics at
-Explain per “notes” on
slide

-Per instructions
attached to forms

-Per instructions
attached to forms

-Per instructions
attached to forms

CHAPTER FIVE: RESULTS
Initial Data Screening
Data analyses for this study were performed using SPSS v11.5 with alpha level of .05,
unless otherwise stated. Simple effects were calculated using the “Simple.exe” program. The
data were first reviewed for accuracy of input by checking for out-of-range values, plausible
means and standard deviations, univariate outliers, and missing data. Initial data screening for
normality, outliers, linearity, homogeneity of regression, multicollinearity and singularity, and
homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices was performed. All measurement scales were
checked for reliability.
The variables were also tested for skewness and kurtosis. There were two minimal
violations of the assumption of linearity (Part A and Part B), homogeneity of variance (Part A),
and slightly unequal cell sizes in the data which could not be resolved. I decided to still use all of
the available participants’ data, while checking for anomalies due to the small differences in cell
sizes. This provided for an increase in cell sizes, and total sample size, contributing to reduced
heterogeneity and increased statistical power (Yang & Sackett, 1996).
I conducted 2 (domain expertise) x 2 (judgment) ANOVAs to determine the effects of
domain expertise, judgment skills, and their interaction on the main dependent variables from the
four parts of the process model of surprise. Post-hoc analyses of simple effects for interactions
found to be significant were also performed. Table 6 displays a summary of the results from the
four ANOVAs which will be discussed next in detail. The means, standard deviations,
reliabilities, and intercorrelations of the measures and variables used in analyses are displayed in
Table 7.
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Table 6
Summary of ANOVAS for Domain Expertise and Judgment

Variable

Partial η2

df

F

Domain Expertise

1

1.95

.07

.17

Judgment

1

5.03

.17

.03*

Domain x Judgment

1

6.34

.20

.02*

Domain Expertise

1

1.34

.05

.26

Judgment

1

1.45

.05

.24

Domain x Judgment

1

7.47

.23

.01*

Domain Expertise

1

0.52

.02

.48

Judgment

1

10.22

.29

< .01*

Domain x Judgment

1

6.42

.20

.02*

Domain Expertise

1

0.09

.00

.77

Judgment

1

5.83

.19

.02*

Domain x Judgment

1

1.83

.07

.18

p

Part A – Assessment of Situation

Part B – Schema Discrepancy Check

Part C – Discrepancy Verification

Part D – Script Switching Process

Note. *Denotes Significant Effect
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Table 7
Means, Standard Deviations, Reliabilities, and Inter-correlations of Study Variables
Variable (# of Items)

N

Mean S. D. 1

1. Domain Expertise (2)

40

1a. Domain Expertise Score (5)

22

41.53 7.9

1b. Demonstrated Knowledge (1)

32

3.53 1.13

1a

1b

2

2a

2b

2c

1.00 .87** .06

.25

-.11

.05

.871

.10

.02

1.00 .09

.01

-.03

2. Judgment (4)
2a. Adaptive Expertise (6)

23

22.43 4.25

2b. Metacognition Scale (4)

23

15.83 4.30

2c. Cognitive Flexibility Scale (3)

31

12.64 2.88

2d. Decision Making (1)

31

4.10 1.19

2d

3b

3c

3d

.39* .36* .30

.07

.22

.06

.02

.22

-.21

.08

-.03

-.09

.57** .62** .59** .58** .75** .96**

.16

3a

.25

.77**2 .62** .06

.44*

.30

.47** .21

.57** .48**

.941

.03

-.20

-.10

.15

-.10

-.09

.01

.471

-.19

-.26

.27

-.17

-.07

-.09

.941

.80** .79** .56** .70** .57**
n/a

-.56** .62** .74** .62**

3. Process Model
3a. Part A – Situation Assessment (4) 31
3b. Part B – Schema Check (3)

31

3c. Part C – Discrepancy Verify (7)

30

3d. Part D – Script Switching (4)

32

.591 .58** .71** .59**

.

.891 .77** .59**
.801

.75**
.781

Notes. ** = p < .01, * = p < .05
1
= Internal Consistencies, 2 = R
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Part A – Assessment of Situation
The results for the ANOVA on the measure for Part A – Assessment of Situation indicated
a main effect of judgment, F(1,25) = 5.03, p = .03, partial η2 = .17. Those classified as having
low judgment (M = -0.44, SD = 1.03) scored significantly lower on the task than the high
judgment group (M = 0.31, SD = 0.47). A significant interaction between domain expertise and
judgment was also found F(1,25) = 6.34, p = .02, partial η2 = .20. The effect of domain expertise
was not significant, F(1,25) = 1.95, p = .17, partial η2 = .07.
Simple effects of the influence of judgment were explored, and significant differences
were found for judgment at low levels of domain expertise, F(1,25) = 11.33, p < .001, partial η2
= .31. The low judgment group (M = -0.82, SD = 1.04) scored significantly lower on the measure
than did the high judgment group (M = 0.48, SD = 0.31). The effect of level of domain (low vs.
high) at low judgment was also significant, F(1,25) = 7.66, p = .01, partial η2 = .23 with the low
domain expertise group (M = -0.82, SD = 1.04) scoring lower than the high domain expertise
group (M = 0.25, SD = 0.58). These results are displayed in Figure 11.
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Mean Z-Scores of Situation Assessment

1.0
.8
.6
.4
.2
.0
-.2
-.4

Domain Expertise

-.6

Low Domain

-.8

High Domain

-1.0
Low Judgment

High Judgment

Judgment

Figure 11. Mean z -scores on Part A for domain expertise and judgment.
Part B – Schema Discrepancy Check
The main effects of domain expertise and judgment on the measure of Schema
Discrepancy Check were not significant, F(1,25) = 1.34, p = .26, partial η2 = .05 and F(1,25) =
1.45, p = .24, partial η2 = .05, respectively. A significant effect was, however, found for the
interaction of domain expertise and judgment, F(1,25) = 7.47, p = .01, partial η2 = .23 as shown
in Figure 12. Investigation of the simple effects of the interaction revealed a significant effect of
judgment (low vs. high) for the low domain expertise, F(1,25) = 7.75, p = .01, partial η2 = .24
where the mean scores of the low judgment group (M = -0.65 , SD = 0.92) were lower than the
mean scores of the high judgment group (M = 0.56, SD = 0.51). Differences in Part B scores
were also significant as a function of domain expertise, at low judgment levels, F(1,25) = 7.57, p
= .01, partial η2 = .23 with low domain expertise group scores (M = -0.65 , SD = 0.92) being
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lower than high domain expertise group scores (M = 0.55, SD = 0.70) for participants with low
judgment.

1.0

Mean Z-Scores of Schema Check

.8
.6
.4
.2
.0
-.2
-.4

Domain Expertise

-.6

Low Domain

-.8
-1.0

High Domain

Low Judgment

High Judgment

Judgment

Figure 12. Mean z -scores on Part B for domain expertise and judgment.
Part C – Discrepancy Verification
Analysis of the effects of domain expertise and judgment on the measure of Discrepancy
Verification showed a significant main effect for judgment F(1,25) = 10.22, p <.01, partial η2 =
.29. Participants with low judgment had significantly lower scores (M = -0.50, SD = 0.68) than
those with high judgment (M = 0.33, SD = 0.64). The interaction of domain expertise and
judgment, F(1,25) = 6.42, p = .02, partial η2 = .20 was also significant. The main effect of
domain expertise was again, non-significant, F(1,25) = 0.51, p = .48, partial η2 = .02. These
results are shown in Figure 13.
Investigation of the simple effects of the significant interaction again found significance
for the effect of judgment at low levels of domain expertise, F(1,25) = 16.42, p < .001, partial η2
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= .40. The scores of those with low judgment (M = -0.77, SD = 0.59) were significantly lower
than those with high judgment (M = 0.56, SD = 0.48). In addition, there were significant
differences of domain expertise (low vs. high) at low judgment, F(1,25) = 5.28, p = .03, partial

η2 = .17, where participants with low domain expertise had scores significantly lower (M = -0.77,
SD = 0.59) than those high in domain expertise (M = -0.01, SD = 0.59).

Mean Z-Scores of Discrepancy Verification

1.0
.8
.6
.4
.2
.0
-.2
-.4

Domain Expertise

-.6

Low Domain

-.8

High Domain

-1.0
Low Judgment

High Judgment

Judgment

Figure 13. Mean z -scores on Part C for domain expertise and judgment.

Part D – Script Switching Process
The results for the ANOVA investigating the effects of domain expertise and judgment on
the measure for the final part of the model, the Script Switching Process, only showed
significance for the main effect of judgment F(1,25) = 5.83, p = .02, partial η2 = .19. Participants
with low judgment had significantly lower scores (M = -0.53, SD = 0.94) than those with high
judgment (M = 0.35, SD = 0.91). The main effects of domain expertise and the interaction were
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not significant, F(1,25) = 0.09, p = .77, partial η2 < .01and F(1,25) = 1.83, p = .19, partial η2 =
.07, respectively. Figure 14 displays the means of the z -scores for this part.
Simple effects tests revealed a significant influence of judgment at low levels of domain
expertise, F(1,25) = 7.10, p = .01, partial η2 = .22 where the scores of those with low judgment
(M = -0.66, SD = 0.85) were significantly lower than those with high judgment (M = 0.66, SD =
0.66). Significance for the effect of domain expertise (low vs. high) at low judgment was not
found in this case, F(1,25) = 0.48, p = .46, partial η2 = .02.

1.0

Mean Z-Scores for Script Switching

.8
.6
.4
.2
.0
-.2
-.4

Domain Expertise
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-.8

High Domain

-1.0
Low Judgment

High Judgment

Judgment

Figure 14. Mean z-scores for Part D for domain expertise and judgment.

58

CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Discussion
The general hypothesis for this study was that judgment would influence reactions and
responses to unexpected events as viewed through a process model, at different stages and in
different ways than would domain expertise. The results from this study overwhelmingly support
this hypothesis and offer insight into how pilots with different levels of judgment skills handle
unexpected events. Overall, general judgment skills showed differential influence in performance
measures at every juncture in the model used as the framework for the study. Conversely, there
were no significant effects of a pilot’s level of domain expertise on reactions to unexpected
events. Most interesting, were the significant interactions between domain expertise and
judgment skills which were found at every stage where measures were taken in the model.
Effects of Domain Expertise and Judgment on Assessment of the Situation (Part A)
This task required the participants detect and perceive the salient cues associated with the
aerodynamic upsets presented as experimental events. The cues included visual cues (displayed
on the flight instruments and out-the-window), tactile cues (yoke or rudder pedal movement),
and proprioceptive cues from movement of the airplane in pitch, yaw, and/or roll. This cue
processing was likely influenced by perceptual and covert biases as put forth by Damasio (1999)
and Kagan (2002). The measure of the task was whether the cues were detected and interpreted
appropriately.
The hypotheses regarding pilots' ability to detect and use the appropriate information when
dealing with an unexpected event were partially supported. I had predicted in Hypothesis 1a, that
the assessment of the situation would covary with domain expertise. This was not supported with
a main effect. However, investigation of the significant interaction between domain expertise and
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judgment revealed a significant difference in scores based on judgment level for low domain
expertise group participants. The simple effect of this interaction was very large (partial η2 = .31)
and showed that there was better assessment of the situation for pilots with higher domain
expertise than those with lower domain expertise at low levels of judgment. This suggests that
domain expertise contributes to the ability to acquire cues at lower levels of judgment skills. This
is congruent with the notion that those more expert in a domain possess a wider selection of
patterns suitable to an appropriate action script (Schützwohl, 1998).
However, Hypothesis 1b stated that high judgment may have a detrimental effect (lower
scores) on one’s assessment of a situation. This was also demonstrated and the size of this effect
was large (partial η2 = .23). Participants in the high judgment group had lower scores on
assessment of the situation across levels of domain expertise (low vs. high). High judgment skills
may negatively influence the high domain expertise participants’ ability to perceive and utilize
the appropriate cues present in the unexpected event as compared to those with low domain
expertise. This could be due to the stronger schemas experts are believed to hold, (Schützwohl,
1998) and their possible disregard of cues which do not fit with “known” patterns (Klein, 2003).
An alternative explanation may be due to the likely use of more intuitive decision making styles,
where these unexpected, and often ill-defined events, require more analysis and evaluation
(Kahneman, 2003).
These results indicate (a) at least a certain requisite amount of domain knowledge is
necessary to acquire and use the information (cues) available from the environment, and (b)
well-practiced and often-used schemas and action scripts or the overuse of intuitive processing
may lead pilots to miss or misinterpret salient cues (Hammond, 2000). The results suggest that
high levels of judgment may interfere with “intuitive” processing at higher levels of domain
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expertise while enhancing cue processing for those lower in domain expertise. Even though these
events were highly time sensitive (decisions and actions needed to be completed within an
average of 20 seconds, lest the airplane crashed), it appears there was still time for analytical
reasoning regarding the cues presented as evidenced by the superior performance by those in the
low domain expertise group with high levels of judgment. A summary of possible mechanisms
and explanations which are congruent with these results, at this beginning stage of the process of
responding to unexpected events, are presented in Table 8.
Table 8
Possible Explanations for the Effects of Domain and Judgment on Assessment of the Situation
Judgment Level
Expertise Level

Low Judgment

High Judgment

Low Domain

More effort needed to look for cues
Poor assessment of cues (not familiar)
Covert biases producing high anxiety

Cognitively flexible
Employs more than one decision strategy
Abililty to perceive and process “novel” cues
Less influence of perceptual biases

High Domain

Disregards relevant cues
Cognitively inflexible to “novel” cues

Over-studies irrelevant cues
Too cognitively flexible (never satisfices)

Effects of Domain and Judgment on Schema Discrepancy Check (Part B)
Part B of the process model addressed the pilots’ identification of the event as something
more discrepant than their personal threshold. This threshold determination included the strength
of their activated schemata, the context of the event, and the perceived probability that this event
could happen, especially to them. Even though the participants were expecting aerodynamic
events to occur during the course of the flight (context), there was still the unexpectedness of the
type and size of the event they would encounter. Once the event had been recognized, the pilots
had to determine what “it” was and if “it” was significantly contrary to cues consistent with their
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ongoing action script and activated schemata. Table 9 shows a sample of possible cognitive
mechanisms occurring at this stage of the process.
Hypothesis 2a had predicted that the stronger schemas and erroneous probability estimates
of pilots with high domain expertise may interfere with the correct identification of an event
discrepant with the ongoing action script. Although not significant, high levels of judgment
appeared to negatively influence the identification of an event as discrepant, only for those with
high domain expertise. This could be an indication that high levels of judgment mediate the
initial appraisal of an event because even though the event was expected, the features of the cues
(e.g., rapidity of presentation, magnitude of movement) may not have been expected (Handy,
Green, Klein, & Mangun, 2001).
Hypothesis 2b stated there would be no significant main effect of judgment on the
determination of the unexpectedness of an event. This was supported by the data. The time it
took to initially recognize the event and determine how discrepant it was from their personal,
ongoing script, may have been attributable to the interaction between domain expertise and
judgment. Although this interaction had not been predicted, it showed a moderately large effect
(partial η2 = .23). Further analysis showed there was, again, a significant influence of judgment
at low domain expertise. Better (higher) judgment aided those with low domain expertise more
so than those with low judgment to quickly identify whether the event was indeed discrepant.
The effect size was large, partial η2 = .22. This enhanced ability to determine the event was
discrepant is in line with the Meyer et al. (1997) studies on surprise and unexpectedness which
demonstrated those with a weaker schema for the task, were faster to identify a target as
“different”. On the other hand, it was difficult for those low in domain expertise and low in
judgment to even determine just what was happening.

62

Table 9
Possible Explanations for Effects of Domain and Judgment on Schema Discrepancy Check
Judgment Level
Expertise Level

Low Judgment

High Judgment

Low Domain

Probability estimate errors
Probability estimate errors (lack of knowledge)
Less experience with aerodynamic events Ability to use adaptive expertise for what is known
Weak schema/low threshold
Able to better monitor level of understanding of event
Unable to discriminate novel events

High Domain

Probability estimate errors
Schema may be too strong
Not flexible enough to modify threshold
Unfamiliar context

Probability estimate errors (won’t happen to me)
Schema may be too strong
Threshold set too high
Misapplication of adaptive expertise to cues

Effects of Domain Expertise and Judgment on Discrepancy Verification (Part C)
Part C of the process showed significant effects of judgment and the interaction of domain
expertise and judgment as hypothesized (Hypotheses 3a, 3b, and 3c). This stage of the process
resulted in a measure of the interruption to ongoing cognitive processing and behavioral
activities. The verification of exactly what the event was, and what the appropriate initial inputs
for response to the situation would be, required a mix of intuitive and analytical decision making.
Unfortunately, there was very little time available to analyze and evaluate the unexpected event
before something had to be done. It was quite clear (partial η2 = .29) that judgment enhanced
pilots’ ability to verify the situation and begin a recovery effort. Possible explanations for this
effect are offered in Table 10. These results support research by Mauro, Barshi, Pederson, and
Bruininks (2001) which addressed differences in reactions based on the degree of
unexpectedness of an event. Highly discrepant events were found to elicit negative affective and
cognitive reactions, which could not be countered with an increase in domain knowledge alone.
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It is reasonable to predict that good cognitive flexibility, adaptive expertise, and the ability
to shift decision making strategies aided those higher in judgment skills with analyzing and
verifying the aerodynamic events presented in this study. All of the experimental events, studied
here, were highly discrepant from normal flight regimes, providing the worst-case scenario for
potential interruption of ongoing activities. Therefore, the pilot had to quickly analyze and
evaluate the situation and then reallocate his attention back to the task at hand (flying the
airplane) after verifying the event as discrepant (Wickens, 2003). It was predicted at this stage,
that high levels of judgment would assist those with low levels of domain expertise more than
those with high levels of domain expertise (Hypothesis 3c). This was supported with a large
effect size, partial η2 = .17. The ability of pilots to verify the discrepancy, determine possible
explanations of the event, weigh the associated risks of actions, and employ alternative decision
strategies was integral to their ability to choose the appropriate course of action.
Simple effects also showed that judgment skills made more of a contribution to the
analysis and evaluation for pilots in the low domain expertise group than for those with high
domain expertise. This was a very large effect with partial η2 = .40. This is the stage in the model
where the influence of judgment for those lower in domain expertise becomes increasingly more
helpful. Generally, the action delay created by focusing on the unexpected event could be
devastating if a pilot fixated on only one aspect of the event. Being able to continue processing
and using information from multiple sources (e.g., physical movement of the airplane, visual
cues on the cockpit display, physiological disturbances, etc.) during this analysis and evaluation
phase was critical for recovery from the event to be initiated.

64

Table 10
Possible Explanations for the Effects of Domain and Judgment on Discrepancy Verification
Judgment Level
Expertise Level

Low Judgment

High Judgment

Low Domain

Too many alternatives considered
Long action delay
Fixation possible

Shorter action delay; gets to work on problem
Applies novel solutions to problem
Fixation countered with overt searching for cues

High Domain

May only use intuitive-based decisions
Pattern matching may be flawed
Tendency to not verify discrepancy

Adaptive expertise allows use of known patterns
Cognitively flexible to consider alternatives
Chance of not verifying discrepancy

Effects of Domain Expertise and Judgment on Script Switching Process (Part D)
The hypotheses for the final part in the process model stressed the advantages of judgment
in changing one’s course of action or applying counter-intuitive solutions to dealing with
unexpected events. The results definitely support the notion that judgment skills assist one’s
cognitive and behavioral responses to an unexpected event. The prediction that high levels of
judgment would mitigate potential negative effects of high domain expertise (e.g., cognitive
rigidity) was supported by observing the mean scores; however, the results did not produce a
statistically significant result. Pilots high in domain expertise, with low levels of judgment (M = 0.29, SD = 1.15) appeared to not script shift as well as those with high domain expertise and high
levels of judgment (M = 0.08, SD = 1.05). Hammond (2000) suggested intuitive decision making
would have been useful in dealing with these unexpected aerodynamic events needing immediate
response. It appears in this situation, however, that the use of good judgment skills (including
analytical decision making strategies) contributed to being able to take the correct necessary
actions which, in these experimental events, were actually counter-intuitive. Therefore, the more
expert pilots had to forego their instinctive or intuitive reactions in favor of a response which was
far from their habit patterns to achieve a successful outcome (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001).
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Results demonstrated significantly that good judgment skills may have also enhanced
pilots’ abilities to script shift as evidenced by the implementation of the correct action selection
and execution in response to the event for those with low levels of domain expertise. This
suggested the utility of judgment skills when faced with an unexpected event, in particular, for
those low in domain expertise, supporting Hypothesis 4c. One plausible explanation for this is
the enhancement judgment skills bring to the task of analytical decision making. Regardless of
one’s level of domain expertise, more analytical-based (vs. intuitive) decision making becomes
necessary when dealing with novel or ill-defined events (Kahneman, 2003). People lower in
domain expertise typically use analytical styles of decision making more often and in more
situations than do those with more expertise in a field (Klein, 1997, 2003). The advantage seen
here may be in the practice of using good judgment skills in concert with practiced analytical
decision making. This is evidenced by low domain expertise/high judgment groups’ ability to
script shift, even more readily than do those in the high domain expertise/high judgment group.
A summary of possible explanations for these observations are presented in Table 11.
Table 11
Possible Explanations for the Effects of Domain and Judgment on Script Switching Process
Judgment Level
Expertise Level

Low Judgment

High Judgment

Low Domain

May freeze
May not know an alternative
Correct action, incorrect execution

Will change plans (script shift)
Will attempt something
Correct action, incorrect execution

High Domain

May show confirmation bias
Applies incorrect response

Will change plans (script shift)
Ability to counter intuitiveness
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Discussion
It is now obvious that pilots need to better understand that modern aviation requires more
than knowledge of the principles of flight. The challenge now is to focus on possible remedies
which will ensure the acquisition of good judgment skills in concert with advancing domain
expertise. One logical place to start is with the regulators, who mandate the requirements for the
trainers, who train the trainers, who train the pilots. Judgment skills are integral to the skills
required in this type of domain and cannot be relegated to the preface of a training manual or one
chapter in a book on flying. Research studies, and more realistically training time and
dollars, suggest we will never be able to train for every potential unexpected event. Therefore, as
the results of this study show, the focus of training needs to include teaching judgment skills
along with technical skills.
The long-held belief that judgment skills develop "naturally" with an increase in domain
expertise does not appear to be supported in research, or more importantly, in accident and
incident data. While there is believed to be a moderate correlation of domain expertise and
judgment with time, the data from this study suggest that this does not occur automatically for all
people. Therefore, we need to teach judgment skills early (student pilot), and reinforce often
(every training and evaluation session for the duration). This would be a monumental change for
our aviation system, although we have seen glimpses of hope, such as the theory behind the
Advanced Qualification Program.
The overall results of this study point to the fact that pilots low in domain expertise, but
high in judgment skills, were actually best able to adapt to the unusual circumstances
surrounding the unexpected aerodynamic events. At each stage of the process of reacting to the
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unexpected events, these pilots, low in domain expertise, but high in judgment skills, had the
highest mean performance scores of all the groups in the study. This was a particularly surprising
outcome, but indeed may be one of the most important findings of this work. If judgment skills
are really domain non-specific, then people with good judgment skills, who may not yet be
experts in their field, may have distinct advantages when dealing with uncertain, ill-defined, and
unexpected situations. Furthermore, those who are already domain experts can benefit from
enhanced judgment skills in unexpected situations by thwarting cognitive rigidity and the
overuse of intuitive decision strategies.
Finally, attempting to resolve unwanted outcomes precipitated by an unexpected situation
with more technology and automated devices (e.g., warning systems, alerts, and flight envelope
protection) is not the solution. There will still (and always) be unexpected events which may
become even more difficult to respond to as there would now be another interaction with the
automated function(s). Ultimately, we need to help the human better deal with the unexpected in
a generic sense, because “it” is lurking around every corner.
Limitations of the Study
The most salient limitation of this study was the small sample size in a complex, quasiexperimental design. However, the significant results and moderate to large effect sizes indicated
that additional participants may not have added to the ultimate conclusions of this experiment.
There existed the possibility of mono-method bias in the individual scales used to calculate the
overall judgment score, although, three of the scales had been previously validated and internal
consistencies were high. Also, it must be noted that the data used for assigning pilots to the high
vs. low judgment groups came from different sources (self-report) than those used as dependent
measures in Parts A to D (instructor ratings and post-hoc assessments from the video tapes).
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Consequently, it is likely that pilots in the low judgment group showed poorer judgment on the
flight events not as an artifact of the study, but instead, as a result of their poorer judgment.
Implications for Training
So, what should be trained and how could “it” be implemented into existing training
programs? First, judgment skills, although put forth to be domain non-specific, are not
necessarily domain independent. As the results of this study demonstrated, there is a significant
interaction between domain expertise and the judgment skills. Therefore, attempts to train
judgment skills might best be situated in the context of the specific domain. Briefly, topics and
methods demonstrated to be successful in improving judgment skills are:
- Define, explain, measure, and discuss the concepts of metacognition, adaptive
expertise, cognitive flexibility, and decision making strategies
- Train through helping to build and enhance mental models of equipment,
environments, teams, and situations
- Specifically present conceptual models of situations and tie declarative, procedural, and
strategic knowledge together using judgment skills
- Integrate the above concepts into scenarios used for teaching at every opportunity
- Obtain, distribute, and reinforce examples of the use of good judgment skills in domain
specific situations
- Train and evaluate using scenario-based examples and focus on the adequacy of the
interaction of domain specific skills and judgment skills
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Summary and Outlook
The introduction to this study explored the influence of unexpected events on cognitive
and behavioral processes. It also addressed the possibility that there are two separate skill sets,
domain expertise and judgment, that come into play when dealing with the unexpected. My
investigation revolved around determining to what extent these two skill sets were involved in
pilots’ reactions to aerodynamic events. Using a model which outlined the cognitive processes
elicited by the unexpected, I captured performance measures at each of four representative stages
of activities. The study was conducted with real airline pilots, in a real airplane (In-Flight
Simulator Learjet configured as a typical Transport Category airplane), using real, live, inflight
aerodynamic upsets.
The results of this investigation have shown that pilots with higher levels of judgment
skills (based on measures of adaptive expertise, cognitive flexibility, metacognition, and decision
making strategies) appear to be significantly better at responding and reacting to a selection
(pitch, yaw, and roll) of unexpected aerodynamic events. Aviation experience (years flying, total
flight time, number of different aircraft flown, etc.) made no difference in if, or how well, a pilot
recovered from the upsets. One's level of specific upset recovery knowledge (based on written
tests and instructor evaluations), taken alone, had no influence on the pilot's performance.
However, there were significant interaction effects between upset recovery knowledge and the
level of judgment skills (low or high). In other words, possessing and/or being trained in specific
judgment skills (which are, essentially domain nonspecific) have the potential to enhance pilot
performance; especially when faced with novel, ill-defined, or even everyday unexpected events.
The focus of this body of research was specific to reactions and results of unexpected
events in aviation. Previous studies and investigations (Kochan, Breiter, & Jentsch, 2004)
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have indicated that it is, more often than not, an unexpected event which triggers a process which
results in an unwanted outcome for the "highly experienced" or "expert" aviator. Therefore, there
is reason to believe that these same results would be found in other highly dynamic, complex
domains where there are numerous opportunities to deal with unexpected events. These areas
may include military operations, nuclear power plants, oilrigs, medical operating rooms, law
enforcement, fire fighting, weather forecasting, and national security. Any domain where dealing
with the unexpected may be part and parcel to successful operations may find this study relevant.
Future Research
It should be clear by now that the conclusion from this study is that unexpected events can
be handled better by pilots with better judgment skills, particularly in cases where there is low
domain expertise. The challenge now is to determine how best to utilize this knowledge and
structure programs which will best prepare everyone for dealing with the unexpected and the
potentially deadly results. Specifically, we need to find the optimum curriculum and training
tools needed to teach the diverse skill sets of adaptive expertise, cognitive flexibility,
metacognition, and decision making strategies as the main contributors to good judgment.
Studies are needed to answer the following: Can judgment skills be taught generically and
then applied to specific domains? If not, should “judgment training” be conducted in the context
of the domain at the beginning of training, at the end, for the duration, or not at all? Should
“judgment training” even be a “separate” subject or is it a training philosophy and methodology?
Why do experts at the same level of domain expertise, exhibit different levels of judgment skills?
Were they taught judgment skills, specifically, or was it the nature of their domain task?
The project on which this study was based will be continued. I look forward to the
opportunity to increase the sample and cell sizes and minimize threats to validity. Enhanced
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measures, such as a “Need for Cognition” scale will be included in the research protocol and data
analysis will continue. In addition, the “judgment training” component (the overall training
philosophy, in this case) of the program will be formalized and enhanced. Testing to see if the
composite skill set of judgment already under investigation can be further enhanced in a shortterm training venue will also be initiated. This will provide an opportunity to define a judgment
training protocol and evaluate known and new judgment training strategies, at least in one small
niche, of one small domain, where the unexpected are plentiful.
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APPENDIX A: FAA UPSET RECOVERY TRAINING AND RESEARCH PROGRAM
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FAA Funded FRTC Training and Research Program
This three-day training course is offered to study participants on the Eastern New Mexico
University – Roswell (ENMU-R) campus located on the site of the Roswell Industrial Air Center
(KROW) airport. It consists of classroom instruction and flights in an aerobatic Beech Bonanza and
an In-Flight Simulator (IFS) Learjet, configured as a generic swept-wing twin-engine jet transport.
What sets this program apart is that the training is offered in an IFS aircraft. This aircraft has a flyby-wire flight control system that is programmed to represent the characteristics and feel of a much
larger transport aircraft. Furthermore, upset events are programmed into the system so that the
trainee can experience Loss-of-Control (LOC) in the controlled environment of a simulation albeit
as real-world as you would want. This is our focus because one common thread in nearly all of the
upset-induced accidents we’ve studied is the crew being faced with an abnormal or unknown
aircraft behavior. Clearly, a comprehensive URT program must include not only training in
extreme-attitude-flight but also in analyzing and correcting such an occurrence.
The FRTC training (ground and flight) is tailored to meet individual trainee’s needs. The emphasis
placed on each specific step depends largely on the trainee’s background and recent experience.
However, the core of the flight training is the IFS experience. Current syllabus was developed with
an experienced aviator in mind. We targeted a mid-career captain with high-performance jet time.
That said, we do not assume the trainee has any significant aerobatic experience. The Bonanza
flight is intended to get all trainees up-on-the-step so as to have ample knowledge and proficiency
to handle the Lear flight. However, if the trainee has military fighter experience, the Bonanza flight
could be considered optional. On the other hand, if the trainee has never been upside-down,
additional Bonanza flights might be warranted. In the Lear flight, the trainee must have sufficient
situational awareness to be able to recognize the unusual attitude and sufficient knowledge to know
what to do about it. However, data from the over 200 pilots studied, indicates that this situational
awareness is necessary but not sufficient when it comes to recovering from the challenging jet
upsets pre-programmed into the IFS system. It turns out that the critical skill set required for a
successful recovery is a well-practiced alternate control strategy focused on the precipitating upset
event itself.
Classroom Instruction
The classroom instruction is broken down into two parts. After receiving part one, the trainee is
prepared to fly the Aerobatic Bonanza. Likewise, part two is focused on preparing the trainee for
the IFS Learjet flight. With in that context, in each briefing, the trainees learn the causes of upsets,
the underlying aerodynamic concepts that govern upset recovery, and various recovery techniques.
In discussing upset causal factors, we study previous LoC accidents using National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) developed animations in an effort to teach-by-examples as much as possible.
We find the time spent discussing previous upset events very productive as doing so clearly
illustrates just how difficult recovery can be when faced with real-world constraints such as timepressure, inadequate or unknown information, and stress. The perspective of the Aerodynamics
discussion is the pilot’s view from the flight deck. While the discussion is thorough, it is limited to
what information the pilot can readily extract from normal cockpit displays and on-board systems.
We intentionally deemphasize more complex issues that would not directly contribute to the pilot’s
ability to recover from an upset event. When discussing recovery techniques, the concept of flight
path and how it is controlled is introduced. The discussion covers recovery from all possible aircraft
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attitudes. General categories of upset events are introduced and the requisite recovery strategies are
detailed. In addition to the classroom instruction, trainees are also given instruction in a companion
ground-based trainer.
Companion Ground Trainer
This ground training system is a cab with flight
displays and controls that make it sufficiently
representative of the IFS aircraft to serve as a
familiarization and flight rehearsal tool. After
completing this portion of the training, the
trainee will be familiar with how the IFS
aircraft simulation system operates, the look
and feel of the displays, and will have seen a
broad selection of representative upset events.
The goal is for the trainee to gain first-hand
experience with the scenarios and recovery
techniques to ensure the underlying principals
are understood before the flight training begins.

Companion Ground Trainer Used to Prepare
Trainee for In-Flight Simulator Training

Flight Training
The two aircraft are used in the training: an aerobatic Beech Bonanza and a Learjet IFS. The
aerobatic Bonanza is used to teach unusual attitude recoveries and accelerated flight. Here, the
purpose is to increase the trainee’s ability to recognize and recover from extreme attitudes in an
expeditious manner and, ultimately, to increase the trainee’s situational awareness. The Learjet IFS
aircraft, pre-programmed with upset events, is used to teach actual upset recoveries. The events
programmed into the simulation system range from atmospheric effects and a wake turbulence
encounter to extreme control failures and control surface hard-overs.

Learjet In-Flight Simulator Teaches Trainees to
Recover from Real-World Upset Events

Aerobatic Bonanza Introduces Trainees to
Extreme Attitudes and Accelerated Flight
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IRB Submission Form
1. Title of Project: Expertise and Unexpected Events
2. Principle Investigator(s)
Name:
Ms. Janeen Adrion Kochan
Degree: M.S. in Human Factors
Title:
Ph.D. Candidate
Department:
Psychology
College: Arts & Sciences
Telephone:
863-297-8080
Facsimile: 863-293-1718
Email:
jdkochan@aol.com
Signature:
Janeen Adrion Kochan, M.S.

Date

3. Supervisor (if PI is a student):
Name:
Dr. Florian Jentsch
Degree: Ph.D. in Psychology
Title:
Associate Scientist/Scholar
Department:
Psychology
College: Arts & Sciences
Telephone:
407-882-0304
Facsimile: 407-882-0306
Email:
fjentsch@pegasus.cc.ucf.edu
Signature:
Florian Jentsch, Ph.D.

Date

4. Date of Proposed Project: From: May 18, 2005 To: July 31, 2005
5. Source of Funding (as indicated to the Office of Research):
Federal Aviation Administration Grant 99-G-047
(Extension of grant through December 31, 2005 pending.)
6. Scientific Purpose of the Investigation:
Loss of control in flight was the largest category of fatal accidents reported in
commercial flight operations (Boeing Commercial Airplanes Group, 2003) and the
second largest category of accidents in general aviation (Federal Aviation
Administration, 2003). Research suggests one underlying facet of unwanted outcomes
in aviation is the occurrence of a surprising or unexpected event.
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The purpose of this study will be to investigate how different aspects of expertise affect
one’s ability to detect and react to an unexpected event.
7. Describe the Research Methodology in Non-Technical Language:
The informed consent and surveys will be administered by experimenters to pilots (See
Appendix A). The surveys include subjective rating questions, fill-in questions, and
background/demographics questions. The surveys will be strictly anonymous, and no
questions are asked which could potentially identify any participant.
8. Potential Benefits and Anticipated Risks:
Potential benefits of this study include gaining an understanding of what types of
events pilots perceive as surprising and how unexpected events influence the outcome
of a flight. Only minimal risks associated with filling out the surveys are anticipated for
this investigation.
9. Describe how participant (s) will be recruited, the number and age of
participants, and proposed compensation (if any):
Participants are pilots from regional, commuter, and major airlines who have previously
agreed to participate in an FAA sponsored Upset Recovery Training Program
Research Project. These participates have already given informed consent for a larger
study of which this investigation is a small portion. Please see Appendix B, Approved
Informed Consent and Institutional Review Board Approval Forms from full study.
10. Describe the informed consent process:
All informed consent information will be presented and signed before any surveys are
administered to the participant by the researcher.
I approve this protocol for submission to the UCFIRB.
/
Department Chair/Director
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Date

University of Central Florida

Informed Consent
Name:
Please read this consent document carefully before you decide to participate in this study.
Project Title:
Expertise and Unexpected Events
Sponsor: Federal Aviation Administration
A.

Purpose

The goal of this study will be to investigate how different aspects of pilot expertise affect one’s
ability to detect and react to an unexpected event.
B.

Nature of Test and Experiment

In this research, you will participate in a study investigating the differences in pilot expertise in
responding to unexpected events. This part of the study will consist of three parts. The first part
will focus on obtaining some background information. Next, you will complete a number of
questionnaires that are commonly used in studies on expertise. Your answers on these surveys
will remain completely confidential (see below). Finally, evaluations on your reactions to
unexpected events will be compared with your answers on the questionnaires
C.

Risks and Benefits

Participation in the current study does not involve any risks other than those commonly associated
with filling out personal data questionnaires, which is minimal. All performance and personal data
will be kept confidential. Potential benefits of this study include gaining an understanding of what
types of events pilots perceive as surprising and how unexpected events influence the outcome of
a flight.
D.

Confidentiality of Personal Data and Records

All data in this study will be held in strict confidentiality by the researchers to the extent provided by
law. Individual data will not be revealed to anyone other than the researchers and their immediate
assistants. In particular, individual data, answers to the surveys, and performance measures will
not be revealed to the Federal Aviation Administration, the National Transportation Safety Board,
or to any other airline, flight school, or air carrier. Instead, only group mean scores and standard
deviations will be published in a final report. Individual information will be assigned a code number.
The list connecting my name to this number will be kept confidential and in a secure place. When
the study is completed and the data have been analyzed, the list will be destroyed.
E.

Compensation

No compensation will be provided to the participants.
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F.

Right to withdraw from the study

Participation in this research is completely voluntary. You can withdraw my participation at any
time without penalty or perjury - this includes removal/deletion of any data that may have already
been collected. Should you decide not to complete the mission; no penalty of any kind will be
incurred.
G.

Answers to Questions

This research is conducted by principal investigator Florian Jentsch, Ph.D., and graduate research
assistant Janeen Kochan. Feel free to ask the research assistant any questions you may have.
For any other questions regarding this research, contact Dr. Florian Jentsch:
Dr. Florian Jentsch
Team Performance Lab
University of Central Florida
Orlando, FL 32816-1390
Phone: 407-882-0304
H.

Whom to Contact Regarding Your Rights

Information regarding your rights as a research volunteer may be obtained from:
Barbara Ward, CIM
IRB Coordinator
Office of Research, 12443 Research Parkway, Suite 302, Orlando, FL 32826-0150
Email: IRB@mail.ucf.edu or bkward@mail.ucf.edu
Phone: 407-823-2901
Fax: 407-823-3299
If you believe you have been injured during participation in this research project, you may file a
claim against the State of Florida by filing a claim with the University of Central Florida’s Insurance
Coordinator, Purchasing Department, 4000 Central Florida Boulevard, Suite 360, Orlando, FL
32816, (407) 823-2661. University of Central Florida is an agency of the State of Florida and that
the university’s and the state’s liability for personal injury or property damage is extremely limited
under Florida law. Accordingly, property damage suffered during this research project is very
limited.
Please acknowledge that you are at lease 18 years of age and that the purposes of the
procedures used in this project have been explained to your satisfaction. You understand
that participation in this study is voluntary and that you am free to withdraw at any time
with no penalty. With these acknowledgements, please consent to your participation by
signing below. Thank you.
Signature:
Date:
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PARTICIPANT EXPERIENCE AND FLIGHT TIME
Participant ID #
Please fill out this form as completely as possible. Let us know if you have any questions.
BLOCK 2: FLIGHT TIMES
BLOCK 1: BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Total Flight Hours

Hours in Last Year

Please answer as appropriate:
Total Years Flying:
Are you instrument current? Yes

No

PIC Hours

PIC in Last Year

SIC Hours

SIC in Last Year

Total Hours Military Transport

If no, how long since instrument currency?

Total Hours Civilian Transport

Date of last flight?

Total Instrument Time (Actual)

Did you attend military flight training?

Total Night Time

Total Number of Military Aircraft Flown
List Military Aircraft Flown in Excess of 25 Hours:

Total Hours of Aerobatic Flight
Hours of Aerobatic Flight in Last Year

Fighter:

Total Rotorcraft Hours (Military and Civilian)
Transport:

Total Glider Hours

LTA Hours

Dual Instruction Given (Military and Civilian)

Rotorcraft:

Dual Instruction Given in Last Year
Do you have military flight test experience? (Circle)
Yes

BLOCK 3: SIMULATOR EXPERIENCE
How comfortable do you feel using a computer?

No

Total Number of Civilian Aircraft Flown
List Civilian Aircraft Flown in Excess of 25 Hours:

Not At All Comfortable

Fairly Uncomfortable

Fairly Comfortable

Very Comfortable

How many simulators have you flown (list) ?
Transport:
BLOCK 4: EDUCATION AND EXPERIENCE

Non-Transport:

Aerobatic Experience: (Please check one)
Rotorcraft:

None
Some
Extensive

Do you have civilian flight test experience? (Circle)
Yes

Extent of Aerodynamic Education: (Please check one)

No

List Different Aerobatic Aircraft
Aerobatics (Military and Civilian)

Flown

None
Some
Extensive

Conducting

Source of Aerodynamic Education: (Please check all that
apply)
Pilot Training
Undergraduate
Graduate

Please Circle:
Are you currently flight instructing? Yes

No

Are you a check airman?

No

Yes
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Extent of Control Theory Education: (Please check one)

BLOCK 6: PREVIOUS UPSET RECOVERY TRAINING

None
Some
Extensive

Have you had previous upset recovery training?
No
Yes
If yes, most recent date

Source of Control Theory Education: (Please check all
that apply)

How many times?
Place of upset recovery training:
Airline
Flight School
Other (please list)

Pilot Training
Undergraduate
Graduate
BLOCK 5: UPSET RECOVERY EXPERIENCE

If you have had airline upset recovery training:

How comfortable are you in the practice of recovering
from unusual attitudes in an aircraft?

Was there a formal upset recovery training
No
academic program?
Yes
If yes, how many hours?

Not At All Comfortable
Fairly Uncomfortable
Fairly Comfortable
Very Comfortable

Did the airline include upset training in transition
training?
No
Do Not Know
Yes
Was the training repeated during each recurrent
cycle?
No
Do Not Know
Yes

Have you experienced an inflight upset?
No
Yes
If yes, most recent date

Were simulators used for the airplane-upset
training?
No
Do Not Know
Yes

How many times?
Please describe the most recent event

Did the airline’s instructors receive specific training
for airplane upsets?
No
Do Not Know
Yes
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PARTICIPANT SURVEY #1
Participant ID #
DIRECTIONS: Please answer the following questions by circling the appropriate rating.
1. I believe I will receive excellent ratings for my performance on this task.
Strongly Disagree
1

Somewhat Disagree
2
3

Neutral
4

Somewhat Agree
5

Strongly Agree

2. I'm certain I can handle the most difficult situations presented in this task.
Strongly Disagree
1

Somewhat Disagree
2
3

Neutral
4

Somewhat Agree
5

Strongly Agree

3. I memorize key words to remind me of the important concepts when studying.
Strongly Disagree
1

Somewhat Disagree
2
3

Neutral
4

Somewhat Agree
5

Strongly Agree

Neutral
4

Somewhat Agree
5

Strongly Agree

4. I practice material mentally while “chair flying.”
Strongly Disagree
1

Somewhat Disagree
2
3

5. Considering the difficulty of this task and my skills, I think I will do well on this task.
Strongly Disagree
1

Somewhat Disagree
2
3

Neutral
4

Somewhat Agree
5

Strongly Agree

6. I believe that I will perform within the top 10 % of all participants on this task.
Strongly Disagree
1

Somewhat Disagree
2
3

Neutral
4

Somewhat Agree
5

Strongly Agree

7. I read over my notes and the course materials often when I am in training.
Strongly Disagree
1

Somewhat Disagree
2
3

Neutral
4

Somewhat Agree
5

Strongly Agree

Neutral
4

Somewhat Agree
5

Strongly Agree

Somewhat Agree
5

Strongly Agree

Somewhat Agree
5

Strongly Agree

8. I expect to do well on this task.
Strongly Disagree
1

Somewhat Disagree
2
3

9. I am confident I can do an excellent job on this task.
Strongly Disagree
1

Somewhat Disagree
2
3

Neutral
4

10. I make lists of important terms and memorize the lists.
Strongly Disagree
1

Somewhat Disagree
2
3

Neutral
4
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PARTICIPANT SURVEY #2
Participant ID #
DIRECTIONS: Please answer the following questions by circling the appropriate rating.
1. I believe I received excellent ratings for my performance on this task.
Strongly Disagree
1

Somewhat Disagree
2
3

Neutral
4

Somewhat Agree
5

Strongly Agree

2. I am certain I handled the most difficult situations presented in this task well.
Strongly Disagree
1

Somewhat Disagree
2
3

Neutral
4

Somewhat Agree
5

Strongly Agree

3. I memorized key words to remind me of the important concepts in upset recovery when studying.
Strongly Disagree
1

Somewhat Disagree
2
3

Neutral
4

Somewhat Agree
5

Strongly Agree

4. I practiced the upset recovery material mentally while “chair flying.”
Strongly Disagree
1

Somewhat Disagree
2
3

Neutral
4

Somewhat Agree
5

Strongly Agree

5. Considering the difficulty of this task and my skills, I think I did well on this task.
Strongly Disagree
1

Somewhat Disagree
2
3

Neutral
4

Somewhat Agree
5

Strongly Agree

6. I believe that I performed within the top 10 % of all participants on this task.
Strongly Disagree
1

Somewhat Disagree
2
3

Neutral
4

Somewhat Agree
5

Strongly Agree

7. I read over my notes and the upset recovery course materials often.
Strongly Disagree
1

Somewhat Disagree
2
3

Neutral
4

Somewhat Agree
5

Strongly Agree

Neutral
4

Somewhat Agree
5

Strongly Agree

Somewhat Agree
5

Strongly Agree

8. I expected to do well on this task.
Strongly Disagree
1

Somewhat Disagree
2
3

9. I was confident I could do an excellent job on this task.
Strongly Disagree
1

Somewhat Disagree
2
3

Neutral
4

10. I made lists of the important terms for upset recovery and memorized the lists.
Strongly Disagree
1

Somewhat Disagree
2
3

Neutral
4
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Somewhat Agree
5

Strongly Agree

PARTICIPANT PROCEDURES SURVEY
Participant ID #

1. How can an aircraft’s pitch be controlled?

2. What is the procedure for recovering from an aileron failure (hardover)?

3. How can Dutch roll be dampened in a transport category aircraft?

4. What can happen when flying with a CG too far aft?

5. How do you recover from a nose down trim failure?
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PARTICIPANT SURVEY #3
Participant ID #
DIRECTIONS: Please answer the following questions by circling the appropriate rating.
1. I believe I will receive excellent ratings for my performance on this task.
Strongly Disagree
1

Somewhat Disagree
2
3

Neutral
4

Somewhat Agree
5

Strongly Agree

2. I'm certain I can handle the most difficult situations presented in this task.
Strongly Disagree
1

Somewhat Disagree
2
3

Neutral
4

Somewhat Agree
5

Strongly Agree

3. I memorize key words to remind me of the important concepts when studying.
Strongly Disagree
1

Somewhat Disagree
2
3

Neutral
4

Somewhat Agree
5

Strongly Agree

Neutral
4

Somewhat Agree
5

Strongly Agree

4. I practice material mentally while “chair flying.”
Strongly Disagree
1

Somewhat Disagree
2
3

5. Considering the difficulty of this task and my skills, I think I will do well on this task.
Strongly Disagree
1

Somewhat Disagree
2
3

Neutral
4

Somewhat Agree
5

Strongly Agree

6. I believe that I will perform within the top 10 % of all participants on this task.
Strongly Disagree
1

Somewhat Disagree
2
3

Neutral
4

Somewhat Agree
5

Strongly Agree

7. I read over my notes and the course materials often when I am in training.
Strongly Disagree
1

Somewhat Disagree
2
3

Neutral
4

Somewhat Agree
5

Strongly Agree

Neutral
4

Somewhat Agree
5

Strongly Agree

Somewhat Agree
5

Strongly Agree

Somewhat Agree
5

Strongly Agree

8. I expect to do well on this task.
Strongly Disagree
1

Somewhat Disagree
2
3

9. I am confident I can do an excellent job on this task.
Strongly Disagree
1

Somewhat Disagree
2
3

Neutral
4

10. I make lists of important terms and memorize the lists.
Strongly Disagree
1

Somewhat Disagree
2
3

Neutral
4

86

PARTICIPANT SURVEY #4
Participant ID #
DIRECTIONS: Please answer the following questions by circling the appropriate rating.
1. I believe I received excellent ratings for my performance on this task.
Strongly Disagree
1

Somewhat Disagree
2
3

Neutral
4

Somewhat Agree
5

Strongly Agree

2. I am certain I handled the most difficult situations presented in this task well.
Strongly Disagree
1

Somewhat Disagree
2
3

Neutral
4

Somewhat Agree
5

Strongly Agree

3. I memorized key words to remind me of the important concepts in upset recovery when studying.
Strongly Disagree
1

Somewhat Disagree
2
3

Neutral
4

Somewhat Agree
5

Strongly Agree

4. I practiced the upset recovery material mentally while “chair flying.”
Strongly Disagree
1

Somewhat Disagree
2
3

Neutral
4

Somewhat Agree
5

Strongly Agree

5. Considering the difficulty of this task and my skills, I think I did well on this task.
Strongly Disagree
1

Somewhat Disagree
2
3

Neutral
4

Somewhat Agree
5

Strongly Agree

6. I believe that I performed within the top 10 % of all participants on this task.
Strongly Disagree
1

Somewhat Disagree
2
3

Neutral
4

Somewhat Agree
5

Strongly Agree

7. I read over my notes and the upset recovery course materials often.
Strongly Disagree
1

Somewhat Disagree
2
3

Neutral
4

Somewhat Agree
5

Strongly Agree

Neutral
4

Somewhat Agree
5

Strongly Agree

Somewhat Agree
5

Strongly Agree

8. I expected to do well on this task.
Strongly Disagree
1

Somewhat Disagree
2
3

9. I was confident I could do an excellent job on this task.
Strongly Disagree
1

Somewhat Disagree
2
3

Neutral
4

10. I made lists of the important terms for upset recovery and memorized the lists.
Strongly Disagree
1

Somewhat Disagree
2
3

Neutral
4
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Somewhat Agree
5

Strongly Agree

UPSET RECOVERY QUALITY RATING SCALE
To optimize the in-flight simulation based upset recovery training, we need to be able to
measure how much the participant’s ability to recover, from a variety of upsets, improved during
the training. Then we need to assess the value of the various events to the participant. In other
words: How much did you learn?; and: How valuable is what you learned to you?
Measuring a pilot’s ability to recover is a difficult task. Unfortunately, the seemingly
straightforward concept of measuring performance parameters such as reaction times, maximum
bank or pitch angles, etc. may be inadequate in similar circumstances. The reasons for this are
manifold and would require a separate document to discuss. Perhaps a simple thought experiment
from everyday experiences may best illustrate the difficulty of measuring how readily a task is
accomplished by measuring the performance.
Consider that a single driver has two cars; car “A” steers poorly, car “B” steers like a dream.
If you follow each of these cars for 10 miles, with the same driver, you may not be able to tell
which car drives the best. When he drives car “A”, he pays strict attention to the task and rarely
stays from the center of the lane. When he drives car “B”, his attention may wander to other things
resulting in his straying further from the center of the lane than that with car “A”. To the outside
observer, using quantitative measures, it might appear the car “A” drives better. The most
expeditious way of finding out which car drove the best is to ask the driver. He will be able to tell
you unequivocally about his mental and physical workload, his level of apprehension and or stress,
and his confidence in doing the job, none of which can accurately be determined from the
performance. Driver opinion would then say car “B” was the better. Thus, in the long run, it may
be much more cost effective and accurate to ask the driver (or the pilot) to provide the evaluation.
The flight test organizations around the world have adopted the Cooper-Harper rating scale
to facilitate quantifying aircraft handling qualities. The Cooper-Harper scale considers performance
and workload to assist the pilot at arriving at a single rating accompanied by supporting comments.
Measuring the quality of a pilot’s recoveries presents a similar problem. We must consider
both the performance, and the mental and physical workload. So we have modified the CooperHarper Handling Quality Scale to fit our needs. The resulting Recovery Quality Rating Scale is
shown below. Currently it is used near the beginning of the Upset Training portion of the flight to
obtain a “beginning” rating and then again after practice near the end of the flight for an “ending”
rating. This is aimed at answering the question: How much did the participant learn from the
practice? The second question, (How valuable is what was learned to the participant?) is addressed
by a post flight evaluation form filled out by the participant at the end of the entire course.
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LEAR INSTRUCTOR CARD #1
Participant ID #:

Instructor:

1. The apparent anxiety level of the participant prior to flight was:
Very Relaxed
Relaxed
1
2
Comments:

3

Anxious Very Anxious
4
5

Performance Impaired

2. The participant’s overall performance as compared to the average airline pilot was:
Poor
1
Comments:

Fair
2

Good
3

Very Good
4

Excellent
5

3. During the flight the participant was:
Very Relaxed
Relaxed
1
2
Comments:

3

Anxious Very Anxious
4
5

Performance Impaired

Nose High Trim Runaway (Circle)
Recognized:
Yes No
Time to Recognition Was:
Immediate Delayed
Verbalized:
Yes No
Initial Recovery Inputs Correct:
Yes Somewhat No
Recovery:
Yes Difficulty
No
Seconds
Time to Recovery:

Excessive
None
None

Aileron Failure - Hardover (Circle)
Recognized:
Yes No
Time to Recognition:
Immediate Delayed
Excessive
Verbalized:
Yes No
Initial Recovery Inputs Correct:
Yes Somewhat No
None
Recovery:
Yes Difficulty
No
None
Seconds
Time to Recovery:
Rudder Failure - Hardover (Circle)
Recognized:
Yes No
Time to Recognition:
Immediate Delayed
Excessive
Verbalized:
Yes No
Initial Recovery Inputs Correct:
Yes Somewhat No
None
Recovery:
Yes Difficulty
No
None
Seconds
Time to Recovery:
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LEAR INSTRUCTOR SURVEY
Participant ID #:

Instructor:

1. The participant’s overall monitoring of the environment for changes, trends, and
abnormal conditions was.
Poor
1

Fair
2

Good
3

Very Good
4

Excellent
5

2. Overall, the participant recognized the upset events in sufficient time to initiate
recovery:
Strongly Disagree
1

Somewhat Disagree
2
3

Neutral
4

Somewhat Agree
5

Strongly Agree

3. Overall, the participant verbally communicated the correct nature of the event.
Strongly Disagree
1

Somewhat Disagree
2
3

Neutral
4

Somewhat Agree
5

Strongly Agree

4. Overall, the participant demonstrated knowledge of the appropriate recovery
technique(s) after an average amount of practice (i.e., compared to the average
participant).
Strongly Disagree
1

Somewhat Disagree
2
3

Neutral
4

Somewhat Agree
5

Strongly Agree

Somewhat Agree
5

Strongly Agree

5. The participant exhibited skill in situation awareness.
Strongly Disagree
1

Somewhat Disagree
2
3

Neutral
4

6. The participant attempted to obtain additional help or information regarding the
situation.
Strongly Disagree
1

Somewhat Disagree
2
3

Neutral
4
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Somewhat Agree
5

Strongly Agree

UPSET RECOVERY TRAINING
PROGRAM SURVEY
Thank you for your participation in the URT program. We would like to know how effective the course elements were in improving your
airmanship in relation to recovering from future upsets you might encounter.
Participant ID #
1
Poor

DIRECTIONS: Please answer the following questions about
the URT program by circling the appropriate rating.
11.

Example:
1
Poor

2

3
Fair

4
Good

5
Very Good

12.

BLOCK 1: ACADEMICS (GROUND SCHOOL)
1.

The classroom instruction overall was:
1
Poor

2.

13.

2

3
Fair

4
Good

5
Very Good

2

3
Fair

4
Good

5
Very Good

2

3
Fair

4
Good

5
Very Good

Excellent

2

3
Fair

4
Good

5
Very Good

Excellent

BLOCK 3: LEAR FLIGHT

Excellent

2

3
Fair

4
Good

5
Very Good

14.

2

3
Fair

4
Good

5
Very Good

Overall the Lear flight was:
1
Poor

15.

Excellent

16.
Excellent

19.

Overall the Bonanza flight was:
1
Poor

2

3
Fair

4
Good

5
Very Good

20.

The benefit of the confidence maneuvers (lazy-8,
loop, aileron roll, etc) flown in the Bonanza was:
1
Poor

2

3
Fair

4
Good

5
Very Good

21.
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2

3
Fair

4
Good

5
Very Good

Excellent

2

3
Fair

4
Good

5
Very Good

Excellent

2

3
Fair

4
Good

5
Very Good

Excellent

2

3
Fair

4
Good

5
Very Good

Excellent

2

3
Fair

4
Good

5
Very Good

Excellent

The nose up trim failure recoveries were:
2

3
Fair

4
Good

5
Very Good

Excellent

The aileron failure recoveries were:
1
Poor

The “g” awareness demo in the Bonanza was:

Excellent

The wake turbulence recoveries were:

1
Poor

Excellent

5
Very Good

The nose low unusual attitude recovery (transport
category aircraft characteristics, use of g and
bank, control strategies, etc.) was:

1
Poor
Excellent

4
Good

The nose high unusual attitude recovery (transport
category aircraft characteristics, use of g and
bank, control strategies, etc.) was:

1
Poor

BLOCK 2: BONANZA FLIGHT

3
Fair

The Dutch roll demonstration and recoveries was:
1
Poor

Comments on academics:

2

The center of gravity changes demonstration was:
1
Poor

18.

10.

5
Very Good

Comments on Bonanza flight:

1
Poor

9.

4
Good

Excellent

17.

8.

3
Fair

Excellent

The briefing on upset recovery (recovery process,
crew coordination, automation, etc.) was:
1
Poor

7.

Excellent

2

The nose low unusual attitude recovery in the
Bonanza was:
1
Poor

The briefing on aerodynamics and aircraft control
(dihedral, crossover, large aircraft differences, etc.)
was:
1
Poor

6.

5
Very Good

Excellent

The bonanza profile briefing was:
1
Poor

5.

Fair

4
Good

5
Very Good

The briefing on unusual attitude recovery (attitude,
pitch and bank effect, corner speed) was:
1
Poor

4.

3

4
Good

The briefing on aerodynamics and aircraft control
(flight path, force, and controls) was:
1
Poor

3.

2

3
Fair

The nose high unusual attitude recovery (use of g
and bank) in the Bonanza was:
1
Poor

Excellent

2

2

3
Fair

4
Good

5
Very Good

Excellent

22.

The rudder failure recoveries were:
1
Poor

23.

4
Good

5
Very Good

Excellent

2

3
Fair

4
Good

5
Very Good

Excellent

The complete hydraulic failure recoveries were:
1
Poor

25.

3
Fair

The nose down trim failure recoveries:
1
Poor

24.

2

2

3
Fair

4
Good

5
Very Good

Excellent

Comments on Lear flight:

28.

BLOCK 4: OVERALL COURSE
26.

Overall the Upset Recovery Training program was:
1
Poor

27.

2

3
Fair

4
Good

5
Very Good

Excellent

What do you think could be done to improve the
training? What would you like to see added,
expanded upon, or left out?
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Overall comments on the course including what
aspects you found most informative and least
informativel.

DEBRIEFING SURVEY

Participant ID #

11. What was the most important aspect of your upset recovery training?

12. Which recoveries did you find the most difficult?

13. Why?

14. How do you plan on maintaining your proficiency in upset recoveries?

15. What do you consider the most dangerous aspect of loss of control in flight?
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DESCRIPTIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETEION OF URT FORMS

Form Name

Description and Purpose

Participant
Experience and
Flight Time

-“Participant Experience and
Flight Time”
-To gather demographic and
flight experience information
from the participants to use in
data analysis
-“Self-Efficacy and
Metacognitive Score #1”
-Used to ascertain how well
participants think they will
perform and how they think
about the task
-“Self-Efficacy and
Metacognitive Score #2”
-Used to ascertain how well
participants think they
performed and how they
thought about the task
-“Participant Knowledge Quiz”
- Used to assess declarative
and procedural knowledge
regarding upset recoveries

Participant
Survey #1

Participant
Survey #2

Participant
Procedures
Survey

When to
Administer and
to Whom

How to
Administer and
Explain

-Participant
completes prior to
start of Training

-Send prior to
training or have
participant complete
upon arrival
-Instructions on form

-Participant
completes just
prior to Lear
Pretest flight

-Hand form to
participant after filling
out informed consent

-Participant
completes just
after Lear Pretest
flight

-Hand form to
participant at the end
of Pretest Lear flight

-Participant
completes after all
academics

-Hand form to
participant at the end
of academics at
“Research Slide”
-Explain per “notes”
on slide
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Form Name

Description and Purpose

Lear Instructor
Card #1

-“Lear Instructor Card
Pretest”
-Used to gather information
on anxiety level and pilot
performance on pretest upset
maneuvers during Lear flight
-“Beginning Upset Recovery
Quality Rating Scale”
-Used to evaluate quality of
upset recoveries

Upset Recovery
Quality Rating
Scale

Upset Recovery
Quality Rating
Scale

Lear Instructor
Survey

Upset Recovery
Training Program
Survey

-“Ending Upset Recovery
Quality Rating Scale”
-Used to evaluate quality of
upset recoveries
-Lear “Situational Awareness
Linked Instances Adapted to
Novel Tasks” (SALIANT),
mindfulness measure
-Used to gather information
on the pilot’s situation
awareness during the flight
-“Upset Recovery Training
Program Evaluation Survey”
-Used to gather pilot
perceptions and opinions on
all elements of the URT
program

Debriefing
Survey

-“Experimenter Debriefing
Survey”
-Used to gather additional
information regarding
retention of training and views
on loss of control

DVD

-Audio and video recording of
the computer generated
instrument display in Learjet
-Used for data extraction after
flight
-Flight history
- Records parameters such
as attitude, airspeed, altitude,
control surfaces, pilot control
inputs, and control law values
at 100 frames per second.

CD-ROM

When to
Administer and
to Whom

How to
Administer and
Explain

-Instructor
completes after
Lear Pretest flight
(immediately after
Lear flight)
-Participant
completes (with
Instructor
assistance) before
Lear Pretest flight
-Participant
completes (with
Instructor
assistance) after
each Lear flight
-Instructor
completes just
after each Lear
flight

-Per instructions
attached to forms

-Participant
completes after all
training activities
are complete or
returns via mail

-Hand form to
participant and ask to
fill out now or return
in envelope
-Stress the
importance of this
information to the
program

-Experimenter
verbally
administers to
participant after all
training activities
are complete or via
telephone
-Archive with data

-Archive with data
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-Per instructions
attached to forms

-Per instructions
attached to forms

APPENDIX C: EXPERIMENTAL PROTOCOL
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Expertise and Unexpected Events Research Project
Procedure Overview
The current Upset Recovery Training (URT) program offered by the Flight Research
Training Center under contract to the Federal Aviation Administration is continually monitored
and revised to maximize training effectiveness. The purpose of this customized protocol is to
address the specific training needs of the all-cargo airline and collect the data necessary to refine
the course elements for this target pilot population. This protocol incorporates the training and
data collection aspects of the current URT protocol under FAA Contract No. 6647-1. The
methodology and events selected for this protocol were determined through initial analysis of
existing URT study data and the review of loss-of-control accident and incident data.
Training Condition
Table 1 displays the order of training and the evaluation events for this customized
protocol. The content, description, and presentation of the training and evaluation events and
associated performance measures are presented in detail in Table 2. The majority of the
performance measures and data to be collected are as discussed in the original experimental
design of the URT program. In addition, repeated measures of self-efficacy and metacognition
will be collected (Participant Performance Questionnaire). Instructor real time objective and
subjective measures will also be recorded during the evaluation flights. The instruments and
forms to be used in this calibration study are displayed in Appendix B.
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Table 1
Order of Training and Evaluation Activities by Condition
ORDER OF
ACTIVITY

1

2

3

4

5

6

Lear
Pretest

Academics
(Bonanza
Briefing)
I

Bonanza

Academics
(Lear
Briefing)
II

Ground
Simulator

Lear
Training/
Lear
Posttest I

CONDITION

All Trainees

Table 2
Content of Training and Evaluation Activities with Associated Performance Measures
Activity
Lear Pre-Brief
Lear Pretest

Content
Safety briefing for Lear Pretest
At altitude, participants will experience
three upset events;
1) Nose up trim failure
2) Aileron failure (hardover)
3) Rudder failure (hardover)

Academics I
(Bonanza Briefing)

1) Causes of upsets
2) Aerodynamic fundamentals
3) Recovery techniques
1) Stalls
2) Unusual attitudes
3) Accelerated flight
1) Causes of upsets
2) Aerodynamic fundamentals
3) Recovery techniques
1) Introduction to upsets
2) Practice in recovery techniques
1) Real world experience of upsets
2) Practice in recovery from a variety
of upsets
At altitude, participants will experience
three upset events;

Bonanza Flight

Academics II
(Lear Briefing)
Ground Simulator
Training
Lear Training

Lear Posttest I
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Performance Measures
- Pretest Self-Efficacy and
Metacognition Scale
- Instructor Performance Rating
(Reaction Time, Success in
Recovery, Stress Indices)
- Situation Awareness Rating
- Recovery Quality Rating Scale
- Postflight Self-Efficacy and
Metacognition Scale
- Flight Performance Parameters

- Instructor performance rating

- Declarative Knowledge Quiz on
Upset Recoveries

- Pretest Self-Efficacy and
Metacognition Scale

1) Aileron failure (hardover)
2) Nose up trim failure
3) Rudder failure (hardover)
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- Instructor Performance Rating
(Reaction Time, Success in
Recovery, Stress Indices)
- Situation Awareness Rating
- Recovery Quality Rating Scale
- Postflight Self-Efficacy and
Metacognition Scale
- Flight Performance Parameters

Flight Profile Standardization
The flight profiles are standardized by utilizing scripted scenarios and calibrated computer
generated events in the IFS. The instructor pilot administers the protocol in a uniform manner
across participants and IFS events. Any deviations from the scripted protocol will be noted on
the Instructor’s Evaluation Card. The study administrator will also monitor the consistency of the
training and evaluation events.
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NOTE: The order of activities will vary dependant on the participant’s experimental condition.
1) Review participant folder for completeness including:
a) Informed Consent Form
b) Pilot Demographic Form
c) Pilot Flight Time Form
d) Experimenters’ Checklist
e) Participant Performance Questionnaire #1
f) Participant Performance Questionnaire #2
g) Participant Performance Questionnaire #3
h) Participant Performance Questionnaire #4
i) Situation Awareness (SALIANT) Form #1
j) Situation Awareness (SALIANT) Form #2
k) Instructor’s Lear Evaluation Card #1
l) Instructor’s Lear Evaluation Card #2
m) Instructor’s Bonanza Evaluation Card
n) Recovery Quality Rating Scale #1
o) Recovery Quality Rating Scale #2
p) Flight Releases (1-4)
q) Program Evaluation Survey
r) Experimenter’s Debriefing Form
2) Have participant fill out the Informed Consent forms, Pilot Demographic Form, and Pilot
Flight Time Form.
3) Make copy of pilot certificates, driver’s license, and medical certificate.
4) Administer Participant Performance Questionnaire #1. While participant completes this,
check over demographic and flight time forms for complete information. If information
appears to be missing, query participant.
5) Present study introduction from transcript.
Study Introduction Transcript
Thank you for your participation in the URT program. As you know, we are
constantly evaluating the components of the training; therefore, your training may occur
in a slightly different order than other participants. You will complete all phases of the
program and indeed will have the opportunity to fly the Lear more than once. Today, we
will take a short flight in the Lear as an introduction to the training program. Once we
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are at altitude, you will have the opportunity to fly the IFS and experience a few of the
upsets.
6) Administer Participant Performance Questionnaire #1 to participant.
7) Learjet Evaluation Briefing (per program).
8) Lear flight - Administer Lear Pretest protocol as printed on Instructor’s Lear Evaluation Card
#1 and complete Instructor’s Lear Evaluation Card #1.
9) Administer Recovery Quality Rating Scale #1 to participant.
10) Administer Participant Performance Questionnaire #2 to participant.
11) Instructor completes Situation Awareness Form #1.
12) Academics I – Bonanza briefing (per program).
13) Bonanza flight (per program); complete Instructor’s Bonanza Evaluation Card.
14) Academics II – Lear briefing (per program).
15) Administer knowledge quiz.
16) Ground simulator training (per program).
17) Administer Participant Performance Questionnaire #3 to participant.
18) Lear flight II; Administer Lear training (per program) followed by Lear Posttest I protocol as
printed on Instructor’s Lear Evaluation Card #2 and complete Instructor’s Lear Evaluation
Card #2.
19) Administer Recovery Quality Rating Scale #2 to participant.
20) Administer Participant Performance Questionnaire #4 to participant.
21) Instructor completes Situation Awareness Form #2.
22) Administer Program Evaluation Survey; encourage comments.
Experimenter’s debriefing form completed.
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